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Foreword 
THE PAPERS presented in this volume were delivered at a conference held on 
April 2, 1980, in Iowa City under the sponsorship of the Center for the Study 
of the Recent History of the United States, a cooperative undertaking involving 
the State Historical Society of Iowa, the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, 
and The University of Iowa. Representatives of the three named institutions 
had been encouraged in the fall of 1975 by President Willard L. Boyd of The 
University to consider how they might work together to make a larger contri- 
bution to the study of the history of the United States in the twentieth century, 
and we decided that our efforts should focus at the outset on the resources for 
the study of recent American history available in the three libraries. This con- 
clusion led to the publication in 1977 of A Guide to the Resources, which had 
been compiled by Boyd Keith Swigger under the direction of an advisory com- 
mittee. 
After a generous gift to help the proposed Center make a beginning had 
come from Mr. and Mrs. Clem T. Hanson of Moline, Illinois, the advisory 
committee, composed of Peter T.  Harstad, director of the State Historical So- 
ciety, Thomas T. Thalken, director of the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, 
Lawrence Angove, executive director of the Herbert Hoover Presidential Li- 
brary Association, Professors Lawrence E. Gelfand and Ellis W. Hawley of The 
University's history department, and the undersigned, decided that the funds in 
hand should be used to conduct a conference on "Three Progressives from Iowa: 
Gilbert N. Haugen, Herbert C. Hoover, and Henry A. Wallace." Instructors 
of recent American history and closely related bjects in all of Iowa's colleges 
and universities and other residents of Iowa be r ' ved to have an interest in the 
purposes and potential of the Center were invited to the conference, and about 
I70 attended. Additional funding for the conference on "Three Progressives 
from Iowa" came from the Procter and Gamble Fund of Cincinnati, Ohio, and 
this enabled the Center to plan for printing the three papers and the commen- 
tary delivered in an afternoon session on March 22, 1979, and the single, longer 
paper presented in the evening. All five of the speakers had been requested to 
submit manuscripts which could be published in a separate volume, and these 
appeared in a bound volume of eighty pages edited by John N. Schacht and pub- 
lished in 1980 by the Center under the title of Three Progrt*ssives jiom kouu: Cil- 
bert N. Haugen, Herbert C. Hoover, Henry A. pallace. 
The success of the meeting held in March of 1979 created among the par- 
ticipants a desire for the Center to sponsor a second conference, and the advi- 
sory committee which had planned the first agreed to arrange for a second and 
decided at the outset to follow the pattern of a one-day meeting with papers to 
be delivered in afternoon and evening sessions. A theme, "Three Faces of Mid- 
western Isolationism," with papers to be presented in the afternoon on Gerald 
P. Nye, General Robert Wood, and John L. Lewis, plus a commentary, and an 
after d i n e r  presentation reviewing American foreign policies between the two 
world wars was proposed, and the five scholars whose papers appear in this 
book agreed to present segments of the topic as outlined. The conference held 
on April 2,1980, and the printing of the papers delivered then were funded by a 
second gift to The University from the Procter and Gamble Fund of Cincinnati 
and by additional support from The University of Iowa Foundation. 
All of the members of the advisory committee who planned the second con- 
ference sponsored by the Center are grateful to the Procter and Gamble Fund, 
1. to The University of Iowa Foundation, to the five speakers whose papers appear in the pages which follow, to John N. Schacht of the Reference Department in 
1 the University Libraries, who prepared the copy for the printer, and to the many others who helped to make the second conference a worthy successor to 
I the first. Enthusiastic reactions to the first two conferences conducted by the 
I Center are voiced in the encouragement received from participants for a third, 
and, as this is written, arrangements are underway for another to be held in the ) fall of 1981. 
LESLIE W .  DUNLAP 
Dean of Library Administration 
The University ofIowa 
Chairman ofthe Advisory Committee 
Gerald P. Nye and Agrarian Bases 
for the Rise and Fall of ~merican Isolationism 
O N  SUNDAY afternoon, December 7, 1941, in Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania, Re- 
publican Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota addressed a large audience 
that had crowded into Soldiers and Sailors Memorial Hall for a meeting spon- 
sored by the America First Committee. The lean, brown-haired midwesterner 
looked younger than his forty-nine years. Nye stood five feet ten and one-half 
inches tall and weighed less than 160 pounds. He was an unusually talented 
speaker. His low, resonant, almost musical voice projected an earnest intensity 
and conviction that moved and captivated his audience. Nye's message was of 
vital concern to his listeners, for he was discussing influences that he said were 
moving the United States ever closer to involvement in the bloody wars then 
raging in Europe, Africa, and Asia. He was admonishing his listeners against 
intervention in World War 11. In the midst of his speech a reporter handed the 
senator a brief note informing him that Japanese military planes had attacked 
United States naval and air forces at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. That shocking 
news brought Nye's speech and the meeting to an abrupt end.' It was the last 
of some 160 America First meetings that Senator Nye addressed. And it was the 
last public meeting sponsored by the isolationist America First Committee. 
The Japanese attack ended the Committee's long  losing battle against interven- 
tion in World War 11. It very nearly ended Nye's much longer isolationist ef- 
forts. In 1944, the next time he faced election in North Dakota, voters brought 
his nearly twenty-year career in the United States Senate to an end. 
Senator Nye was one of America's leading and most controversial isolation- 
ists, opposing intervention in foreign wars and arguing against entanglement in 
alliances or the League of Nations. In 1934-1936 he led the Senate Committee 
Investigating the Munitions Industry that was both an expression of and a force 
for isolationism. He was a key figure in the enactment of neutrality laws in the 
I930s, helping in hundreds of speeches throughout the country to publicize and 
popularize noninterventionist views. He provided colorful leadership for oppo- 
nents of the increasingly internationalist andinterventionist policies of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. And Nye was a tireless spokesman in 1941 for the Amer- 
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I ica First Committee, the leading mass pressure group battling against interven- 
tion in World War IL2 
Senator Nye was important in his owp right. But if he had been unique or 
"one of a kind," he would have been less significant in the history of American 
foreign affairs than he actually was. Insofar as Nye represented foreign policy 
projections of agrarian interests and values, however, he was part of long-term 
patterns extending back through Nebraska's William Jennings Bryan at the 
turn of the century to Virginia's Thomas Jefferson at the beginning of the his- 
tory of the United States. Jefferson wrote that "thow who labor in the earth 
are the chosen people of God, if h e r  He had a chosen people." He worried 
about that day in the remote future when land in America would be so filled 
that people would be "piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe." Jef- 
ferson doubted that democracy could long survive in such a ~ e t t i n g . ~  In his 
"Cross of Gold" oration Bryan exclaimed that "the great cities rest upon our 
broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your 
cities will spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms and the grass 
will grow in the streets of every city in the country."' On  that subject of farm- 
ers and firming, Nye spoke the language of Jefferson and Bryan with vigor and 
conviction. And in his own day Nye's agrarian perspectives were shared in 
varied degree by most of the leading Senate isolationists, including William E. 
Borah of Idaho, Hiram Johnson of California, George W .  Norris of Nebraska, 
Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, Arthur Capper of Kansas, Lynn J. Frazier of 
North Dakota, Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota, and Robert M. La Follette, Jr., 
of Wisconsin.5 Even important midwestern business men, such as General 
Robert E. Wood of Sears, Roebuck and Company in Chicago and Henry Ford 
of the Ford Motor Company in Dearborn, Michigan, shared some of the per- 
spectives that moved Nye to i~olationism.~ 
Specifics varied from individual to individual, but there were common strands 
running through the lives and values of thow and other leading isolationists. 
One may highlight some of those. patterns by examining Nye's background. 
values, and activities. Born on December 19. 1892, in the small town of Hor- 
tonville, young Nye was reared in the agricultural state of Wisconsin during 
the Populist-Progressive era. He was guided to manhood by the example of his 
newspaperman father. Nye and his father followed Wisconsin's "Fighting Bob" 
La Follette in progressive paths. From 1911 to 1925, as an aggressive young 
newspaper editor, first in Wisconsin, later in Iowa, and finally in North Dakota, 
Gerald P. Nye crusaded for progressive reforms. As editor of the Creston Daily 
PIain Dealer in Iowa in 1915-1916, he endorsed much of President Woodrow 
Wilson's New Freedom program.' 
Though Nye supported Wilson on most issues, acute agricultural difhculties 
in North Dakota and protests by the Nonpartisan League moved the young 
newspaper editor to agrarian radical political activism after World War I. Ap- 
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pointed to the United States Senate as a progressive Republican from North Da- 
kota in 1925, he served nearly twenty years, until defeated near the close of 
World War 11. In the Senate he was an insurgent Republican, agrarian pro- 
gressive, a "son of the wild jackass," and m isolationist. On both domestic and 
foreign policy issues he worked with other western agrarian progressives, in- 
cluding Borah, Johnson. Norris, Capper, Wheeler, Frazier, Shipstead, and La 
Follette.* 
Many variables go into the making of any individual's character, style, and 
values. So it was with Nye. To a striking degree, however, Senator Gerald P. 
Nye's foreign policy views grew directly out of his agrarian radicalism and his 
opposition to dominance by urban industry and finance. Traditionally, the 
western farmer put a premium on self-reliance and hard work. But from the 
farmer's frame of reference, nature on the one hand and "special interests" on 
the other robbed him of the fruits of his labor. In coping with drought, grass- 
hoppers, and winter storms, the farmer supplemented his labors by turning to 
his God and to Lady Luck. But in contending with "special interests" he in- 
creasingly turned to political action. Financiers who held the mortgage on his 
farm, industrialists who manufactured his equipment, railroads that carried sup- 
plies to the farmer and his products to the market, and merchants who distribu- 
ted his produce all seemed, in the farmer's view, to take an unconscionably large 
part of the returns from his labor. And the farmer identified those ''special in- 
terests" with cities- whether those cities were as nearby as Fargo, St. Paul, and 
Chicago, or as remote as New York and London. The farmer saw those eastern 
urban business interests as selfish, exploitive, and evil. They reaped where they 
had not sown; they enriched themselves at the expense of the farmer. And the 
farmer often saw the government as serving those "selfish interests" by shower- 
ing special privileges upon them. 
Western farmers and their political spokesmen generally did not want gov- 
ernment ownership of the means of production and distribution. Most at that 
time did not even want subsidies for agricult*. But they wanted to end the 
special privileges of their urban exploiters. They wanted the government to re- 
strain abuses by urban industry, railroads, and creditors so that the farmer 
would be charged fair prices for their services. As young Nye phrased it early in 
his North Dakota political career, the government should "give equal privileges 
to all; or take them away from those specially privileged now." Those were the 
circumstances and attitudes that spawned the Populist movement in the 1g8os, 
the Nonpartisan League during and after World War I ,  and agrarian progres- 
sivism. In the depression decade of the 1930s they supplemented other interests 
in sustaining President Roosevelt's New DeaL9 
But those agrarian considerations did not stop at the three-mile limit. When 
projected into foreign affairs, those same attitudes became variations of Ameri- 
can isolationism. Most farmers (and most isolationists) were patriotic and fa- 
I ' 
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vored building and maintaining military forces to defend American security and 
interests. Most farmers realized that they were affected by foreign markets and 
foreign suppliers. But many objected to foreign policies they believed were in- 
spired by the same "dfuh'. urban interests that exploited them on the domestic 
scene. They objected to being taxed to pay for expensive battleships whose 
purpose was not so much to defend America as to subsidize eastern steel manu- 
facturers and shipbuilders. They opposed sending those high priced ships to 
distant lands to defend the investments and businesses of eastern financiers. 
They opposed imperialism that seemed not so much for spreading democracy 
and freedom as for guarding the investments and loans of Wall Street financiers. 
They opposed involvement in foreign wars that, in their judgment, were not 
essential for national security but were, instead, designed to further enrich east- 
ern urban financiers, munitions makers, and shippers. And they resisted war 
propaganda that used patriotic appeals to arouse support for ventures abroad 
that s d  more essential to urban business interests than to Arnetia. national 
security and freedom. 
Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota Wly shared those general attitudes on both 
domestic and foreign affairs during his years as a progressive Republican in the 
United ~t.tes Senate. Those attitudes moved him to battle against pro-business 
policies of the Republican Coolidge and Hoover administrations. They led him 
to support much of Roosevelt's New Deal while at the same time criticizing 
pro-business policies of the National Recovery Administration. And those at- 
titudes projected hi into the national limelight as chairman of the Senate Spe- 
cial Committee Investigating the Munitions Industq in 1934-1936. Senator 
Nye's attacks on Wall Street's House of Morgan, on the Du Ponts and other 
munitions makers, and on shipbuilders were consistent with his agrarian radi- 
calism and with that of his rural and small town constituents. Furthermore, it 
was logical that the neutrality legislation he proposed in the 1930s would have 
imposed no direct restraintk on farmers but would have restricted the economic 
activities of urban financiers, manufacturers, and shippers. The isolationist 
movement was by no means exclusively rural and small town. But Gerald P. 
Nve and most leading Senate isolationists reflected in varied forms those agrar- 
ian values in both domestic and foreign affairs.1° 
In the 1920s and 1930s Nye and other western progressive isolationists at- 
tacked the war-making activities of big business and big finance. Like Thomas 
Jefferson long before, however, they feared K i s s  of almost any sort, including 
big military, big government, and big labor. In January, 1935. Nye said that 
nothing in his munitions investigation had astonished him so much as discover- 
ing that "instead of munitions-makers promoting the military activities of gov- 
ernments, governments -especially our own war and navy departments- have 
b a n  actively promoting the munitions-makers, for years." He complained of 
"a that the United States government had "in the business of sell- 
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ing American munitions of war." At that time he did not directly criticize the 
presidency; he sympathized with the chief executive's difliculties in withstmd- 
ing pressures from powerful urban economic interests. He favored legislation 
limiting the president's role in foreign affairs to help him resist such pressures." 
By the latter part of the 1930s and on into the 1940s, however, Nye increasing- 
ly attacked the war-making proclivities of the presidency in general and of Pres- 
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt in particular. By 1941 he denounced President 
Roosevelt for leading the country toward war while professing to be working 
for peace. He charged that the president was using dictatorial methods on the 
pretext of fighting dictatorships, that in fighting for the Four Freedoms abroad 
Americans were losing their freedoms at home. He objected to excessive presi- 
dential power in foreign affairs, to secrecy and deception. He feared that Roose- 
velt was deliberately using American aid to Britain shorr-of-war as steps-to-war, 
and that the president sought and hoped for shooting incidents in the Atlantic 
that might propel the United States into wars raging abr0ad.u Despite the at- 
tention now focused on Iowa and New Hampshire briefly once every four 
years, in the twentieth century political parties, presidential nominations and 
elections, and administration policies are shaped and controlled largely by urban 
considerations -not by farmers or by rural and small town America. 
It is easy to illustrate how Senator Nye's foreign policy attitudes fell within 
the framework of agrarian interests. Nye blamed American participation in 
World War I for many of the farmers' economic difficulties in the 1920s and 
193os, and he saw no reason to believe that American involfrernenc in a second 
world war would have any better effects on the farmers' lot. The munitions in- 
vestigation was a logical extension in the realm of foreign affairs af Nye's long 
crusade against big business, international bqnkers, and Wall Street. Initially 
the munitions investigation was at least as anti-business as it was anti-war. La- 
ter the investigation broadened its attack so that the executive branch of the 
government as well as big business came under fire. The neutrality laws sup- 
ported by Nye imposed no sigrdcant limitatio on a m m e ;  the self-denying 
provisions in the legislation applied to the urban segments of the 
economy. For example, the arms embargo that Nye supponed prohibited the 
export of certain types of industrial products but placed no comparable restraints 
on the export of agricultural and mineral products. The bans on loans and the 
cash-and-carry provisions inhibited urban Qanciers and shippers, but the effects 
on the farmer were indirect at most. Nye opposed large naval appropriations 
and thus would have restricted government "pump priming" in urban ship- 
building and steel manufacturing centers of the East, Since North Dakota got 
very few war contracts, limiting military appropriations might have been to its 
economic advantage; in effect such limitations would have reduced federal sub- 
sidies to eastern urban areas and made tax increases for North Dakota less nec- 
essary.13 
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Some of Senator Nye's proposals were never enacted; some were passed in 
modified forms; some became law much as he wanted; and nearly all were re- 
p l e d  before the United States declared war in December, 1941. Recommen- 
dations by Nye that never became law included nationalizing munitions indus- 
tries, taxing the profits out of war, banning the sale of non-munitions to bel- 
ligerents, and a constitutional amendment that would have required a national 
referendum to declare war except in case of attack or immediately threatened at- 
tack by a non-American state against the Western Hemisphere. The failure to 
adopt much of Nye's program. and the repeal of most of the neutrality legisla- 
tion before Pearl Harbor, prevented isolationists from demonstrating whether 
they could or could not have kept the United States out of war without endan- 
gering American security. For all practical purposes the neutrality laws were 
gone before Pearl Harbor." 
Explanations for the decline and fall of Senator Gerald P. Nye and American 
isolationism may be found in both international and domestic developments. 
On the world scene, part of the explanation may be traced to changing power 
relationships that undermined the comfortable security the United States had 
enjoyed earlier. The gradual erosion of the relative power of Great Britain and 
France, plus the emergence of the increasingly powerful and ambitious Ger- 
many in Europe and Japan in Asia, upset nineteenth-century security arrange- 
ments. World Wars I and I1 not only dramatized the deteriorating power 
positions of Britain and France, but contbuted to their decline (and to the les- 
sening of American national security). After World War I1 the weakened con- 
dition of Britain and France, the temporary eclipse of German and Japanese 
power, and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major world power pre- 
sented the American people with an extremely disturbing international situa- 
tion in which the security taken for granted in the nineteenth century was gone. 
That alarming state of affairs was made more terrifying by the destructive 
capabilities of weapons created by science and industry and commanded by the 
leading adversaries in the Cold War. The first atomic bomb was not set off un- 
til after Gerald P. Nye had been retired from public life in 1945. Intercontinen- 
tal bombers (even with conventional bombs) were not a practical reality during 
his years in the United States Senate. Nonetheless, the changes in power rela- 
tionships on the world scene and the destructive capabilities of weapons de- 
veloped rapidly during his public career. The disintegration of the old balance 
of power, the rise of aggressive challenges from the Central Powers, the Axis, 
and later from the Soviet Union, the creation of fantastically destructive weap- 
ons-all those developments on the world scene combined to endanger Ameri- 
can national security and to help defeat Senator Nye and American isolationism. 
The developments and conditions that doomed isolationism were not, how- 
ever, limited to other parts of the world. In addition to external influences, 
forces within the United States also contributed to the decline of isolationism. 
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Among those were fundamental socio-economic changes within the United 
States. Those changes related to the rapid urbanization of American society 
that accompanied the phenomenal growth of American business, industry, fi- 
nance, and labor. The foreign policy views represented by Thomas Jefferson, 
William Jennings Bryan and Gerald P. Nye fell into disfavor partly as a result of 
the rise of the city and the decline and "urbanization" of agriculture in the Uni- 
ted States. 
At the time of the h t  census in 1790 (when Jefferson became secretary of 
state), 95 percent of Americans were classified as rural, and most of them were 
farmers. Only about j percent were urban, and those Americans lived in rela- 
tively small communities by European or twentieth-century standards. Through- 
out American history, however, the urban population has increased at a faster 
rate than the rural population. Even before Nye was appointed to the Senate in 
\ 1925, the total urban population exceeded rural-though not in North Dakota. 
By 1980 more than three-fourths of Americans were classified as urban. Urban 
. , 
population and income exceeded rural in most states, including such traditional- 
I., ly farm states as Iowa and Nebraska. Some 20 percent of the American people 
lived in the "suprmetropolis" extending almost continuously for nearly five 
hundred miles along the northeastern seaboard. That huge concentration of i 11 people, talent, industry, and capital exerted an influence on American thought, 
?J 3 taste, education, national politics, and foreign policy that far exceeds its pro- 
portion of the population. Urbanization was both a cause and an effect of fun- 
$':# damental economic developments. When Nye became a senator the United 
. States was already the leading industrial and financial center in the world. In 
. '.. , 1980 less than 4 percent of the American people were h e r s ,  and many of 
those got part of their incomes from non-farm s?urces.1s 
Farmers and farms not only declined in numbers, they also changed greatly. 
I .  Science and technology revolutionized farming methods just as they affected ur- 
' ban manufacturing. Commercial farms grew strikingly in size, capitalization, 
. mechanization, and production. The enlarged operations, coupled with mar- 
a keting difficulties, inspired sophisticated mana&ial and organizational innova- 
\ . tions that often gave the producer, processor, and distributor a community of 
'?, interests cutting across rural-urban lines. The spectacular increase in grain ex- 
ports in recent years gives midwestern farmers a keen awareness of the impor- P tance of foreign markets that is comparable to the awareness held by tobacco qm - growers in the eighteenth century, by cotton planters in the nineteenth cen- 
tury, and by many industrialists in the twentieth century. Furthermore, the 
'% modes of living for twentieth-century commercial farmers differed little fiom 
. -.I those of persons on comparable social and economic levels in the cities. The 
"urbanization" of American agriculture did not wholly eliminate differences be- 
tween rural and urban interests and views on foreign &airs, but it did reduce 
, many of those differences. 
- 
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Senator Nye's analyses were perceptive and accurate in some ways, but fun- 
damentally they were many years behind actual economic, political, and foreign 
policy developments in the United States. Agriculture had ceased to be the pri- 
mary base for the American economy; industry and finance had taken over that 
role long before. He underestimated the importance of foreign markets to the 
farmer and overestimated the capacity of the domestic market to absorb the tre- 
mendous output of American farms. Furthermore, rural purchasers, though 
still important, could not begin to absorb all the goods and services that cities 
had to sell in order to achieve and maintain prosperity. Substantial urban and 
foreign markets (including tremendous military preparedness programs) have 
seemed essential to absorb the phenomenal production of urban America. Nye's 
prediction in 1940 that "two- or three-billion-dollar military programs an- 
nually" would be insufficient if agriculture became "a secondary consideration" 
grossly underestimated the 150 billion dollar military budgets of our own time. 
His explanation for military preparedness programs overemphasized economic 
influences and neglected national security considerations. Nonetheless, the 
huge expenditures for national defense have helped sustain an effective demand 
for American goods and services-predominantly urban and industrial. The 
economic benefits derived from exports and defense programs extend into every 
state. But Nye's North Dakota's share of defense contracts was always at or 
near the bottom of the list.16 
Since North Dakota remained largely rural, Nye's agrarianism did not, by 
itself, doom him to defeat there. With more skilled handling of his political 
lines in North Dakota, it is conceivable that he might have been returned to the 
Senate in spite of urban dominance elsewhere. But even if he had managed to 
get reelected, his Lguence in Washington on foreign policy matters could only 
have been negligible. The reverses he had already suffered on the national level 
symbolized the erosion of the agricultural base for isolationism. Insofar as isola- 
tionism was rooted in the interests and values of agriculture in the upper Mis- 
souri-Mississippi-Ohio river valley, the relative decline of agriculture virtually 
assured its defeat. That is not to say that isolationist views grew only out of 
economic influences or that the economic bases were only agricultural. But the 
decline and "urbanization" of the farmer in the United States reduced the po- 
litical power that isolationists could command. The views that Gerald P. Nye 
represented were overwhelmed partly by an urban society based on commerce, 
industry, finance, and labor. 
In an age when most Americans were farmers, Thomas Jefferson was twice 
elected president of the United States. He became the revered symbol of an 
era and of a way of life and thought. Even William Jennings Bryan a century 
later could win nomination to the presidency three times on the Democratic 
party ticket. But the shattering of ihe old agrarian sectional alliance between 
the South and West, the growth of cities, and the revival of farm prosperity C 
(and complacency) combined to assure Bryan's defeat. Gerald P. Nye could and 
did win political victories in the agricultural state of North Dakota. Excep- 
tional circumstances plus his own considerable political abilities enabled him to 
win some skirmishes on the national scene. He was even mentioned as a dark- 
horse possibility for the Republican party presidential nomination. But his ef- 
forts to restore the farmer to the political dominance he had known in the age 
of Jefferson were doomed to defeat in the twentieth century by the changed 
nature of the American economy and by changed world conditions. 
Isolationism may not be completely dead in the United States. It is, none- 
theless, so much weaker than it was forty or fifty years ago that it seems almost 
a negligible element on the American political scene. And insofar as it depends 
upon agriculture it cannot expect a significant revival. If isolationism ever be- 
comes powerful in American attitudes and policies again (which is unlikely), it 
will have to find other sources of sustenance to replace and supplement agri- 
culture. 
NOTES 
I Interview with Senator Gerald P. Nye. Washington. D.C., July 20, 1959; M. E. Armbruster 
to Page Hufty, Dec. 11, 1941, and attached undated clipping from Pittsburgh k s s ,  America First 
Committee Papers, Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, Calif.; U.S. Con- 
gress, Senate, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Oct. 23, 1942, CongressionalRecord, 8574; and, in the Gerald 
P. Nye Papers, the following items: clippings from Pittsburgh Press, Dec. 8, 1941, and Piluburgh 
Sun Telegraph, Dec. 8, 1941; John B. Gordon to Nye. Dec. 9, 1941; Nye to Gordon, Jan. 7, 1942; 
undated account of Pittsburgh America First meeting in Nye's handwriting. apparently written 
Dec. 9, 1941; and memorandum, Nye to Whomsoever &y be Concerned, July 3,1969. When I 
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The Isolationism of General Robert E. Wood 
ALTHOUGH we have no full-length biography of General Robert E. Wood, 
we have long associated his name with American isolationism. In 1940 and 
1941, the prominent Chicago manufacturer headed the America First Commit- 
tee, the leading isolationist action group organized before the Japanese attacked 
Pearl Harbor. In addition, and for a much longer period, he led Sears, Roebuck 
and Company, and in the process became one of the most ~owerful business 
leaders of modern times.' 
General Wood's career contained several paradoxes. Although a military 
man, he was deeply opposed to American involvement overseas, and although 
an articulate defender of capitalism, he endorsed much of the New Deal. Even 
in later life, when he was a staunch conservative, his business record was unor- 
thodox, perhaps even a bit radical. He was a leader, for example, in anti-trust 
campaigns, and he pioneered in corporate decentralization, profit-sharing, and 
philanthropy. 
Wood challenged the label of isolationist. He said in 1951, "To the best of 
my knowledge there has never been a real isolationist, one corresponding to the 
definition of an isolationist generally attributed to that word by the easterners. 
I have never met a man who believed that we could let this country live by itself 
and have no relations with other countries. On the other hand, there are a lot 
of people who believe in America First, who ha* been generally opposed to the 
foreign policy of the government and are still opposed to it."2 Yet, if one'de- 
fines isolationism in terms of opposition to United States involvement in Euro- 
pean war and America's unimpaired freedom of action, as does Wayne S. Cole, 
Wood certainly qualified.' 
Let me be brief about the general's military and business career. Wood was 
the son of a coal and ice merchant who had served with John Brown's raiders. 
He was born in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1879. He graduated from West Point 
in 1900 and was sent to the Philippines to help suppress the insurrection there 
led by Emilio Aguinaldo. "I was in the saddle all the time," Wood recalled, 
"chasing all those guerillas in the mountains."' In 1905 he was sent to Panama, 
where he became director of the Panama Railroad Company. While there, he 
became a protigk of General George W. Goethals, who promoted Wood, then 
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only twenty-six years old, to chief quartermaster. During the construction of 
the Panama Canal, Wood hired thousands of employees and distributed mil- 
lions of dollars worth pf supplies. 
Upon retiring from the army in 1915, Wood became assistant to the president 
of General Asphalt. Two years later, when the United States entered World 
War I, he was reactivated and sent to France, serving as a colonel in the Forty- 
second, or "Rainbow," Infantry Division. The following year Goethals called 
him back to Wuhington, where Wood-at age thii-nine-wu commissioned 
brigadier general and acting quartermaster general for the entire army. During 
the war he bought and distributed food, clothing, and materiel for some four 
million troops. 
In I919 he became a vice-president of Montgomery Ward, but less than five 
vears afterwards he moved to Sears, where in 1928 he became president. - - A dy- .- 
J 
namic and innovative businessman, he pushed retailing, pioneered in proht- 
sharing, and launched scores of new manufacturers as Surs suppliers. A short, 
wiry man, he would often be seated at the rolltop desk ie his modest 00ice on 
Homan Avenue in Chicago, where he would doodle incessantly, eat caramels 
with the wrappas still on, and preface a decision with the q, "Let's chap!" 
He studied census reports and the Smtktical Abstract in order to plan new Sears 
operations. He lived modestly, driving a Ford, riding the commuter train from 
his home in Lake Forest, and wearing clothes "~icked off the pile" at Sears. 
Company executives still recall his sloppy attire. 
But despite Wood's &ir for innovation, few would have expected him to 
embrace the New Deal. Yet in I932 Wood, a Republican, endorsed Roosevelt 
for the presidency. His reason, he later claimed, was that "a pretty cold selfish 
set of men" from New York and New England had gained control of the Re- 
publican party. Between 1933 a d  193s Wood served on several New Deal 
agencies: the Industrial Advisory Board of the National Recovery Administra- 
tion, the Federal Allotment Board of the Works Progress Administration, and 
the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce. 
Certain Roosevelt policies in particular drew Wood's support, among them 
currency inhtion, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Securities Exchange 
Act, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and reciprocal trade. He backed R o o r  
velt for a second tan, although by 1935 he was having wmnd thoughts. For 
example, he was strongly opposed to the codes devised by the National Re- 
covery Administration. As time went on, he became increasingly critical of the 
New Deal. FDR's purge of southern party leaders, the court-packing plan, his 
alleged encouragement of John L. Lewis's effort to unionize industrial workers, 
the anti-business rhetoric of mtain prominent New Dealers-all these rouaed 
the general" ire. 
It was, however, the outbreak of war in Europe that turned Wood definitely 
against the Roosevelt administration. True, he was a member of the National 
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Nonpartisan Committee for Peace Through Revision of the Neutrality Law, a 
group headed by Kansas publisher William Allen White and devoted to repeal- 
ing the arms embargo.5 And true, he backed universal military training. He 
also backed FDR's bid, made in May, 1940, for fifty thousand planes within the 
next calendar year. In July, 1940, he went so far as to hint of his availability for 
the post of secretary of war; three months later, he wrote Colonel William J. 
Donovan, soldier-diplomat close to FDR, asking to serve with American 
ground forces.6 
Yet the whole course of Roosevelt's interventionism disturbed him greatly, 
and he made no secret about it. He might privately tell Roosevelt of his con- 
tinued "affection and high regard," but publicly he endorsed the Republican 
presidential candidate, Wendell Willkie.7 Wood told the isolationist Senator 
Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat from Montana, that had he been nominated, he 
would have had Wood's s ~ p p o r t . ~  No president, Wood believed, should have 
three terms; besides, in Wood's eyes Roosevelt was heading the nation for war. 
American intervention, Wood believed, would only bring disaster: capital- 
ism could survive Hitler's domination of Europe but not America's participa- 
tion in a European war. The United States would be dissipating its strength by 
organizing an expeditionary force, while experiencing communism, fascism, 
and dictatorship.9 Said Wood to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 
October, 1940: 
Victorious or not, we will be faced at the conclusion of such a 
war with great economic dislocations- the rich would face a capital 
levy, the middle classes impoverishment, and the masses a lowered 
standard of living and the loss of most gf the social gains so far se- 
cured. Competent observers believe that if the war is prolonged in 
Europe over one or two years, it will result in communism in all 
Europe, and a species of national socialism in England. If we are in- 
volved, it probably spells the end of capi lism all over the world.10 P 
Wood did not limit his protest to words alone. In July, 1940, he agreed to 
serve as temporary head of the embryonic Emergency Committee to Defend i 1 America First, soon renamed the America First Committee. At first he had misgivings, fearing that he might lose business for Sears, fail to get the needed backing, or harm the candidacy of Republican standard-bearer Wendell Will- 
kie. But he agreed, in September, 1940, to become acting chairman, a position 
: he retained until Pearl Harbor. He later commented that he took the AFC posi- 
tion because "the so-called best people" refused. He spent considerable time at 
the national headquarters in Chicago, occasionally gave speeches under AFC 
auspices, and testified before congressionaf committees. More significantly, he 
personally approved every decision of consequence." 
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Wood's association with America First brought him great personal abuse. 
Harold Ickes publicly accused him of being "apparently a fellow-traveler" of 
Nazism. Wood replied that it was an "old trick for a war party to claim a mo- 
nopoly of patriotism;" he declared that the secretary of the interior spoke for 
"the swivel chair patriots."la Lessing Rosenwald, board chairman of Sears un- 
til 1939 and a prominent Jewish layman, never forgave Wood-according to an- 
other Sears official- for not condemning the Des Moines speech of Charles A. 
Lindbergh, in which the prominent aviator accused the Jews, as a group and by 
name, of "pressing this country toward war."13 
Opposition did not keep Wood from hammering away. Roosevelt, he main- 
tained, was going beyond legitimate defense n.qeds; the president sought overt 
involvement. Lend-lease, Wood claimed in February, 1941, could lead the na- 
tion into war within ninety days, and convoys virtually guaranteed American 
participation in the conflict." 
At times, however, Wood was optimistic about America's staying out of 
war. Speaking to an America First rally at St. Louis in May, 1941, he declared, 
"If we can keep this country out of war for the next few weeks we've got the 
battle won." And when Roosevelt and Churchill released the Atlantic Charter 
two months later, Wood thought that their war aims might "find a receptive 
hearing even in Germany." By September, 1941, however, Wood believed that 
FDR had committed the United States-so much so in fact that he considered 
further immediate antiwar activity useless. America First, he believed, should 
wait until the congressional campaign of 1942. Other Committee leaders, such 
as Charles A. Lindbergh, talked him out of that idea.15 
Although a businessman, Wood little heeded administration warnings of 
Axis economic threats.16 He denied that he admired Hitler, but thought that 
the fascist regimes had made considerable economic progress. In 1938, for ex- 
ample. he wrote Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, "I do not believe 
in autocracy and I am certainly not an admirer of Hitler, but in comparing re- 
sults during the last five years under the Fascist regimes with those of our own 
country and other democracks, it does not look so good for us."" In the spring 
of 1939, Wood sought to trade American cotton and lard for German barbed 
wire and nails. Such barter, he maintained, would reduce United States farm 
surpluses and thus drive up hog prices. In October, 1940, Wood challenged ad- 
ministration claims that the totalitarian nations could out-produce and under- 
sell the United States. "After all," he said, "when two nations on two conti- 
nents each have things the other needs, trade eventually results regardless of the 
feelings each may have for the other." In any "mutual commercial undertak- 
ings" between the Americas and Germany, the relatively self-suacient United 
States would have the advantage. Wood soon asserted that the importance of 
foreign trade was exaggerated: "We have the best home market in the world 
and only about 7 percent of our stuff is exported."'" 
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According to Wood, Nazi military strength was overrated. While powerful 
on the European continent, it was "very weak" some three thousand miles 
away. The Germans did not have a single bomber that could fly from Europe 
and back. In addition, he found it inconceivable that German forces could cross 
the ocean to attack a country of 130 million people.19 
Any alliance alongside Great Britain, Wood believed, was most unwise. In 
a letter to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Wood wrote: "We are weaken- 
ing our defense by trying to bolster up a decadent system and nation. Nature's 
law is survival, and if a race is not strong enough to survive unaided, it will 
perish. "20 
Wood was not as militant as some isolationists. He favored limited aid to 
Britain. For example, he endorsed the destroyer-bases deal and endorsed send- 
ing food and war supplies on long term credit. Important for Wood, however, 
was the possibility of eventual repayment, adherence to the neutrality laws, and 
transfer in Britain's own vesse1s.a' 
In December, 1940, Wood suggested that the press discuss a negotiated peace. 
He revealed his terms to publisher Roy Howard: the restoration of much of 
western Europe, as well as Britain's retention of its empire, with perhaps the re- 
turn of two German colonies. Such a peace would involve German economic 
control of the European continent. But Wood felt compelled to ask, "Wouldn't 
it be better to arrange peace on such terms than for England to continue the 
battle? And if she refused such terms, why should we go to her assistance? 
The average man in the street thinks if peace were negotiated now it would 
mean stripping England of her colonies & fleet. While none of us knows, there 
is reason to believe that peace might be negotiated on the above terxr~s."a* 
Besides, Wood argued, the causes of the war were fundamentally economic, 
not ideological. In no way did they concern the fate of democracy. "We are 
letting our dislike of Hitler and Nazism run away with our feelings," he had de- 
c l a d  in September, 1939. When he testified before the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee in February, 1941, he c l a q d  that Churchill had ptnondy 
told him five years before. "Germany is getting too strong and we must crush 
her. "a 
Despite such isolationism, Wood stressed dloser ties with South America. In 
I940 he claimed that "our true mission is in North Amaic? and South Ameri- 
ca." The United States, he continued, had the rksources and organizing ability 
to develop the "virgin continent" south of its border. "The reorganization and 
proper development of Mexico alone," he said, "would lfford an outlet for our 
capital and energies for some time to come."a 
A strong United States presence in Latin America, Wood said, must be sus- 
tained. On the one hand, he declared that the nation should "try in every way 
to maintain the friendship of our neighbor& to the south." On the other, he as- 
serted that "no government in Mexico, Central America and Caribbean South 
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American countries will be tolerated unless it is friendly to the United States." 
"If necessary," he went on, "we are prepared to use force to attain that object."" 
Wood was not surprised by the Pearl Harbor attack. As soon as he heard the 
news, he said to hdbergh,  "We have been asking for war for months." Roose- 
velt, so Wood believed, realized that Congress would not declare war on Ger- 
many. Hence he had sought other means to precipitate that action. (By 1954 
Wood claimed that FDR and General George C. Marshall. army chief of staff, 
knew that the Japanese would attack. "They have the blood of Pearl Harbor on 
their hands," he said.)% "I am sure history will vindicate us," he wrote an 
America First leader in I942 "While not excusing the treachery of Japan in 
their attack on Pearl Harbor, I cannot help but feel that she was practically 
forced into action at the time by the notes from our own Executive and State 
Departrnents."2' 
Yet Wood felt that he had no choice but to dissolve America First. "With 
nothing for the chapters to do," he wrote Lindbergh, "they would gradually 
fall apart or get into the hands of extremists or radicals who might create con- 
ditions which would give the government an excuse to attack us on the ground 
of subversive activities." Thete were also, he added, &culties in raising m ~ n e y . ~  
In subsequent years Wood urged the provocative historian Harry Elmer 
Barnes to write a revisionist history of the origins of World War 11. "No one is 
better fitted to write it than yourself," he told Barnes in 1943, and by 1954 he 
---... 
had given Barnes well over r2,ooo for various revisionist projects." 
Wood also sought an investigation of the treatment of Tyler Kent. a minor 
diplomat jailed during World War U for indiscreetly dirclosing secret messages 
between Roosevelt and Churchill. In addition, he encouraged the distribution 
of such biting critiques of Roosevelt's foreign policy as journalist William Hen- 
ry Chamberlids Anmica's Second Cwn& (1950). Chmnbalin, he sdd, ''certainly 
vindicates our stand prior to the war," while Rear Admiral Robert A. Theo- 
bald's Final Secret ojPeari Harbor (1954) belonged "in the hands of every person 
in the United  state^."^^ 
Once the Japanese struck, however, Wood sought to serve with a combat 
division. "Hap" H. Arnold, commanding general of the Army Air Forces and 
Wood's closest friend in the military, recommended that Wood be activated 
with two stars; Roosevelt, however, would not permit it. Hence, operating as 
technically as a civilian, Wood taught supply, inspected every air depot in the 
United States, and made five trips abroad, including a trip around the world 
with General Walter H. Frank. Each year he spent six months with Sears, then 
six months with the air force." 
If Wood ever had a pressing anxiety, it was the Soviet Union. By 1944 he 
feared that the Russians would dominate Europe, a situation he seemed to find 
more dangerous than Nazi control. A year later, John T. Flynn testified before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee against United States membership in 
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the new United Nations. Wood backed the journalist completely. "Some- 
times," said Wood to Flynn, "I think our people are drugged or crazy. Cer- 
tainly, the other side has done a complete job of propaganda, so much so that 
the people do not realize what they are being led to."32 
The general objected to the trial of some twenty-six "native fascists" for sedi- 
tion. Moreover, he contributed to the defense of Lawrence Dennis, a so-called 
"fascist" theorist, whose work he had admired since 1941. If, in 1945, Wood 
found Dennis "erratic" as well as "brilliant," there was self-interest at work in 
defending the defendants. He wrote Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher 
of the Chicago Tribune, "The danger in this case is that if these people are con- 
victed (though outside of a few crackpots I cannot see that they are guilty of 
anything), the decision will be used to smear all so-called isolationists including 
members of Congress."" 
Ever the isolationist, Wood opposed much Cold War policy. In August, 
1945, he wrote Lindbergh, "I believe all Europe will go communistic with the 
- 
exception of Britain andthey are going to hav; a very tough row ahead of them 
unless we underwrite them for the next five years."" Yet he preferred out- 
' 
right relief to the loan voted for Britain in 1946, which he called a futile subsidy 
' ! for "a sick and worn-out system." Soon Wood was attacking the Marshall 
'.: Plan. The larger part of Europe, he said, was "finished," and he suggested that 
Englishmen, Belgians, and Germans emigrate from the continent en masse.35 
Wood said in 1952, "While we have to give some aid to Europe, I regard the 
. . . money we do give them as probably lost. Europe is old, tired and overpopula- 
ted. I am convinced that with the exception of the Greeks, they will not fight, 
and they cannot develop their economic possibilities with this problem of over- 
population always pre~ent."'~ Wood initially, supported America's Korean ef- 
fort. In June, 1950, he told General MacArthur that he hoped the war could be 
ended qu~ckly; at age seventy-one, he volunteered to serve MacArthur in sup- 
ply liaison. (Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson graciously replied that he would 
call on Wood if the war spread.)37 Yet in Jaqpry, 1951, Wood endorsed Her- 
bert Hoover's pleas for total withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula.38 
By the early 195os, the general was contemptuous of Soviet power. He doubted 
that the Russians could really make an atomic bomb or that the Red Army was 
capable of offensive warfare. Not only was the Russian air force greatly over- 
rated; if the Russians sent an army into Western Europe, part would revolt and 
part would desert.39 Wood did see some merit in making alliances so as to es- 
tablish overseas air bases, for he found air power the one retaliatory weapon 
that could dissuade the Russians. But he sought drastic cuts in the military 
budget, with the money saved to be used on much-needed roads and schools in 
the Great Plains.40 One of the most curious ventures entered into by Wood 
concerns one C. W.  Boldyreff, a leader in the National Alliance of Russian Soli- 
darists. The Russian Cmigrk was formerly a member of MacArthur's intelli- 

view of history, nostalgia for a simpler and less urbanized America, or militant 
nationalism? If we have a combination of such factors, where does one put the 
most weight? Because Wood's odyssey is so typical of many isolationists, and 
of others once sympathetic to FDR's presidency, it deserves a much more care- 
ful look. 
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John L. Lewis and American Isolationism 
THE ROLE of the American labor movement and its leaders in the making of 
United States foreign policy has rarely received scholarly scrutiny. Probably 
that has been so for good reasons, none better than the labor movement's mar- 
ginal relationship to the making of foreign policy and its members' lack of in- 
terest in the world beyond our borders. If, through most of our history, citi- 
zens have been inward-looking, few have been more so than union members 
and their leaders. 
Those scholars who have examined American labor and foreign policy, most 
notably Ronald Radosh, have focused either on World War I or the Cold War 
eras.' In both instances labor leaders clearly served as advocates and agents of 
official American foreign policy. During and just after World War I, Samuel 
Gompers and his associates in the American Federation of Labor faithfully pro- 
moted the liberal, democratic capitalist objectives associated with Wilsonian 
diplomacy. A generation later, during the Cold War, Gompers' heirs in the 
A. F. of L. and their opponents in the CIO proved equally faithful in serving 
Harry S. Truman's policy of global containment. And, of course, we know 
that no citizen played the hawk with greater enthusiasm during the war in 
Vietnam than "Mr. Labor," the recently deceased George Meany. In short, 
American labor has generally swum comfortably in the prevailing tides of dip- 
lomacy. 
One notable exception to that rule, and a cwtroversial one at that, was John 
L. Lewis's opposition, from 1937 to December 7,1941, to the foreign policies of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Alone among noncommunist labor leaders in the period 
between the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact and the Nazi invasion of Russia, 
Lewis opposed America's drift into war. Whereas most other political critics of 
Roosevelt came either from conservative political or corporate circles-well-known 
enemies of the New Deal-Lewis's opposition came from the heart of the New 
Deal coalition, its labor constituency. So unexpected was Lewis's hostility to 
Roosevelt's diplomacy that, at the time and since, most analysts of the subject 
have thought Lewis to be either a communist dupe, a coconspirator of the Nazis, 
or an egotistical, irrational enemy of Franklin D. Roosevelt.2 Few have sought 
to understand Lewis's position in terms of his historical experience and under- 
lying principles. Today I want to take this occasion to do so. 
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Not until he was thirty-wen years old did Lewis have his h t  real experience 
with foreign affairs. And even then, during World War I, it was primarily 
with diplomacy's domestic impact. Lewis strongly supported Wilson's war- 
time domestic and foreign policies, as did the other labor l& in the A. F. of L. 
and the United Mine Workers of America with whom he was closely associated. 
In return for endorsing Wilsonianism overseas, labor received tangible benefits 
at home: trade union growth, higher wages, shorter hours, and better job 
security. 
But labor's wartime gains proved short-lived. No sooner did the war end 
than employers counterattacked. No union felt the employer offensive more se- 
.verely than the United Mine Workers, in which Lewis in 1919 had just risen to 
the acting presidency. As mine owners tried to push back union gains and de- 
flate wage rates, Lewis and his union found themselves involved in a struggle 
not just against capitalists but also against the federal government. In 1919 
Lewis was subjected to federal court injunctions, presidential edicts, and most 
galling, Justice Department taps of his telephones. Hounded by federal agents, 
its foreign-born members subject to peremptory deportation proceedings, and 
watched by federal troops, the United Mine Workers had no choice but to end 
the 1919 strike on government terms.3 
From his World War I and immediate postwar experiences, Lewis derived 
principles from which he never thereafter deviated. World War I taught him 
that workers suffered as employers benefited from war-induced inflation, es- 
pecially since the few gains which labor won during the emergency period were 
quickly lost after the war. He also saw that, however much influence labor 
gained in Washington as a result of its support of Wilsonianism, it could not 
compare to the power exercised by corporate interests, which dominated all the 
major federal war production agencies. Because workers paid the primary fi- 
nancial costs of war (as well as the human costs), Lewis believed that the labor 
movement should oppose all involvement in foreign conflicts not immediately 
threatening to national security. And if war did come despite labor's best ef- 
forts to maintain peace or as a result of foreign attack, Lewis vowed that trade 
unions would then obtain their essential goals before they pledged support to 
the government and wages were frozen for the duration.' 
Throughout the 1920s, however Lewis's main concerns were domestic, not 
foreign. On the one hand, he worked diligently, and sometimes deviously, to 
gain unchallenged control of the United Mine Workers. On the other hand, he 
desperately sought to save his union and its members from the perils of a de- 
clining coal industry. He succeeded in the former objective but failed abysmally 
in the latter. 
Yet in no way during the 1920s did Lewis seem out of tune with the prevail- 
ing American impressions of the world overseas. Within the labor movement 
and outside it, he appeared as a bastion against communism and Soviet influ- 
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ence. "No one seems to recall that you alone for ten years were the only bul- 
wark against Communism penetrating the United States, when it was a true 
menace," a prominent businessman later wrote to Lewis, "and that you were 
the obstacle to the recognition of Russia."s Anticommunism brought Lewis 
gains within his union and among his Republican party friends. But he was 
never personally a principled, or knee-jerk, anticommunist. Indeed, in 1926 at 
the suggestion of his economic adviser, W.  Jett Lauck, Lewis considered serving 
as the head of an American trade union delegation to Soviet Russia. Then so- 
ber second thoughts about the domestic political implications of such a trip 
I caused Lewis to decline Lauck's proposal. "On the face of it," he wrote to his adviser, "I scarcely like to identify myself with an expedition which might be 
believed by many to be the forerunner of an attempt to bring the Russian situ- 
ation to the forefront in our ~oun t ry . "~  
During the "Prosperity Decade," Lewis also expounded in print certain key 
concepts which shaped his view of the United States and the world. He be- 
I lieved that the United States could develop a prosperous and equitable economy 
without involving itself commercially beyond the Western Hemisphere; that 
1 
I the United States together with its northern and southern neighbors contained 
I a market large enough to sustain mass production, economies of scale, and high 
wages. The American system, Lewis asserted, was based on expensive, not 
cheap, labor-labor that earned enough to buy the products of American indus- 
try and provided a home market insulated from the vagaries of international 
commerce. Thus he wanted the domestic market closed to imported coal, oil, 
and natural gas, and he opposed the efforts of private United States capital to de- 
velop energy resources overseas as well as federal and state programs which bene- 
fited fuels competitive with coal. In sum, he believed that the United States, as 
the giant of the Western Hemisphere, could create a self-contained, autarkic, 
corporate society based on high wages, mass consumption, and steady profits.' 
The Great Depression, to be sure, shattered Lewis's dream of a prosperous, 
contented America. But it also reinforced hisfision of how to construct an 
equitable American system. Everywhere around the globe during the 193os, 
nation-states focused on their domestic difficulties and moved toward neo- 
mercantilistic and autarkic economic policies. Tariff walls rose; import quotas 
tightened; currencies became non-convertible; the gold standard collapsed. Do- 
mestic recovery transcended international comity. The United States proved no 
exception to these trends, and that suited Lewis admirably. Moreover, during 
the depression, Lewis initially had no time to devote to foreign affairs. First, he 
had to resurrect the moribund United Mine Workers and next build the CIO 
and the first successful mass production unions in American history. Only then 
could Lewis even begin to think about the real problems which were emerging 
around the globe and which threatened a new wave of international anarchy 
and war. 
# 
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. By the end of the 1930s Washington policymakers, especially the president, 
clearly concentrated more on foreign affairs than domestic issues. The fascist 
military challenge replaced mass unemployment as public enemy number one. 
As the New Deal tide ebbed, Lewis found himself as critical of Roosevelt's 1 
emerging foreign policies as he had heretofore been supportive of the president's 
domestic reforms. Not that Lewis had the least sympathy for fascism or such 
aggressor nations as Japan, Italy, and Germany. In fact, for years Lewis had 
publicly repudiated fascism and argued that trade unionism and the New Deal 
were the best antidotes against a fascist threat in the United States. By and 
large, however, Lewis defined fascism as a domestic, not a foreign, problem. In 
his view, neither the Japanese assault on mainland Asia, nor the Italian attack 
on Ethiopia, nor German aggression in Central Europe threatened American se- 
curity. Quite the contrary. At an anti-Nazi rally in New York's Madison 
Square Garden in March, 1937, Lewis warned an audience of Jewish-American 
trade unionists that "Europe is on the brink of disaster and it must be our care 
, that she does not drag us into the abyss after her."8 Indeed, Lewis never de- 
parted from his belief that American security lay in domestic reform, not over- 
seas entanglements. He even refused to lobby actively for Roosevelt's prewar 
preparedness program, which might have reduced unemployment ~ubstantially.~ 
Lewis's position on foreign affairs rowed confusion in v h i n g t o n  political I 
and diplomatic circles. Observers of the union leader's behavior could not de- 
I cide if he was a Nazi or a communist sympathizer. They were especially dis- 
( mayed by Lewis's role in Latin American affairs. At a time when the united 
#,, States government was involved in delicate negotiations with the Cardenas gov- 
. . , ernment in Mexico over the property claims of foreign oil companies, Lewis 
i conducted his own private dealings with the Mexican president. In September, 
, :;, 1938, Lewis attended a mass left-wing labor raUy in a Mexico City bullring and 
, in later discussions with Mexican labor leaders raised the possibility of founding 
a new American Hemisphere labor federation to replace the defunct A. F. of L. 
: , 1 Pan-American Federation of Labor. He also conferred privately with President 
' Cardenas, for whom he delivered diplomatic messages to Roosevelt. Such ac- 
tivities led members of the State Department to suspect that Lewis was a con- 
duit for Soviet funds passing to Latin comrnunist~.'~ 
Roosevelt was even more perturbed by Lewis's Mexican oil diplomacy. Work- 
ing closely with William Rhodes Davis, a Texas entrepreneur, oil wildcatter, 
' 
and Democratic party contributor, Lewis used his influence in Mexico to ena- 
ble the Texan to purchase oil for sale to Hitler's Germany. Davis had clear mo- 
tives for his own part in the transaction: to buy oil cheaply from Mexico and to 
r n  1
sell it dearly to Germany. For his part, Cardenas saw an opportunity to break - 
the Anglo-American oil companies' boycott on the sale of nationalized Mexican - 
oil. But what were Lewis's motives? It is unlikely, despite what some recent '. :. 
writers have suggested, that Lewis was involved, unwittingly or not, in Nazi 
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diplomatic intrigues. More likely he believed that by enabling Mexico to break 
the oil blockade, he would earn the friendship of Cardenas and the leftist Mexi- 
can Federation of Labor, raise the influence of the CIO south of the border, and 
strike a blow against imperialism. Regarding the latter point, one must re- 
member that Lewis had a peculiar concept of imperialism. He viewed the Uni- 
ted States as primarily an anti-imperialist nation, which had been sucked into its 
few imperial adventures by the machinations of Wall Street interests (mainly 
the Morgans and Rockefellers) allied with traditional British imperialists." In a 
sense, he thought that America was an innocent abroad. 
But Europe, not Mexico, remained the focus of American diplomacy between 
1937 and 1941. and it was on this front that Lewis and Roosevelt broke most 
sharply. On Labor Day, 1939, Lewis told the nation: 
War has always been the device of the despairing and intellectually 
sterile statesmen. It promises employment in the gun factories and 
begets enormous profits for those already rich . . . . Above all war 
perpetuates in imperishable letters on the scroll of fame and history, 
the names of its political creators and managers. 
Labor in America wants no war or any part of war. Labor wants 
the right to work and live-not the privilege of dying by gunshot 
or poison gas to sustain the mental errors of current statesmen. 
Any attempt to involve the United States in a European war, he concluded, 
would be a betrayal of the national interest.12 
Lewis had good reason to suspect just such a betrayal. Informants provided 
him with details of United States war contingency plans and also asserted that 
the Roosevelt administration was committed to eventual involvement in a Eu- 
ropean conflict. Equally disturbing to Lewis, the contingency plans neglected 
to accord labor as large a role as corporate interests in war production planning." 
This raised for Lewis the spectre of his WorldlWar I experiences. Thus,. al- 
though he allowed the 1939 CIO convention to endorse a proposed revision in 
the neutrality laws which would permit the United States to sell war materials 
to England and France, he still told the same convention audience that, "Safqty 
and security for Americans lie in non-participation in this [European] confliqt 
and the addressing of ourselves to the major problem now confronting us in our 
internal economy and domestic establishment."l4 
By the time of the United Mine Worker convention in January, 1940, Lewis 1 
had grown even more hostile to Roosevelt's foreign policy. He told the union 
delegates in no uncertain terms that no statesman should "believe or dream that 
he is going to solve the unemployment question . . . by dragging America into 
war with foreign countries." The answer a, the questions that concern us, he 
went on, is not to make cannon fodder out of our young men and cover the rest 
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of the nation with grief and lamentations. "That day is gone if my voice and 
my strength can make any contribution to prevent it." And finally, in his clos- 
ing address, Lewis warned that "labor in the United States wants no war or any 
part of war, and that it will hold to strict accountability any statesmen who de- 
part from that declared policy." '5 
Nazi intrigues had little, if anything, to do with Lewis's position on foreign 
affairs. Lewis honestly believed, as did his former political associate Herbert 
Hoover, Republican presidential aspirant Robert A. Taft, and U. S. Steel exec- 
utive Tom Moses, that the European war did not directly threaten United States 
security, and that the Atlantic and Pacific oceans provided America with un- 
breachable defenses. To  go to war unnecessarily, all these men asserted, would 
turn the United States into a garrison society, expand dangerously the power of 
the presidency, make America irremediably imperialist, and turn citizens into 
servants, not masters, of the state. 
Committed to such beliefs, Lewis in the spring and summer of I940 fought 
Roosevelt's foreign policy. He told one audience that our youth "are not again 
going to be butchered in a European country, or upon a foreign shore."t6 And 
he told IO,OOO Flint auto workers that any politician who seeks to involve the 
United States in a foreign war "is going to show himself as nothing more or less 
than a fool."17 Lewis also spelled out for his audiences the domestic implica- 
tions of war. "Build up a gigantic military instrumentality and quarter it upon 
the people under a Roosevelt or under any other president, call it a defensive 
mechanism," he warned, "but sooner or later will come a Chief Executive on 
horseback . . . [who] will carry out his imperialistic dream and con~eption."'~ 
By summer's end Lewis prophesied to a left-wing union audience that when 
Rooswelt finally had his war, American liberties would disappear as "the United 
States first becomes a militaristic nation, and second, becomes an imperialistic 
nation, to carry out the dreams of conquest of some would-be dictator."'9 Fi- 
nally, a week before the election, he informed a national radio network audience: 
"May I hope that on election day [you] will with the sacred ballot, lead the re- 
volt against the candidate who plays at a game that may make cannon fodder of 
your 
Roosevelt's reelection proved to Lewis that United States involvement in the 
European war was only a matter of time. But it also partially silenced his public 
criticisms. He continued quietly to involve himself in antiwar activities with 
such conservative and isolationist groups as the America First Committee. But 
Lewis now concentrated more on guaranteeing trade unionism further gains be- 
fore war came, insuring the labor movement a role commensurate with busi- 
ness influence in defense planning, and protecting labor's interests during actual 
war. Here, too, Roosevelt stymied Lewis. The president permitted corporate 
executives to dominate defense planning, and he appointed Sidney Hillman as 
his adviser on labor matters, a direct slap at Lewis.2' 
When war came after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Lewis played the 
role of true patriot. He ceased all public criticism of Roosevelt's foreign policy 
and announced his own support of the war effort.   ore over, he wasted little 
time in joining with other labor leaders in offering the administration a "no- 
strike pledge" for the duration of the war. The UMWA backed all the war 
loan drives, encouraged miners to achieve record levels of production, and saluted 
the men in uniform. Lewis personally demanded that every union effort must 
be aimed at total military victory.22 
During the war, however, Lewis concentrated on how federal policy affected 
workers on the home front, not on Roosevelt's diplomacy. He wanted to in- 
sure that labor did not suffer unduly from war-induced inflation, and he feared 
that the government was implementing "a paradoxical policy that runs to the 
premise of rewarding and fattening industry and starving labor." That fear and 
the reality that coal miners did in fact bear the costs of inflation led Lewis to 
confront Washington during the 1943 wartime national coal strike. Yet, how- 
ever much Lewis fought governmental policies in the economic and production 
spheres, he never allowed wildcat walkouts or authorized strikes to pose a real 
threat to the war effort.23 
Neither during the war years nor in the immediate postwar era did Lewis 
publicly break with basic United States foreign policy. He did not criticize the 
United Nations or the diplomatic settlements which ended the war. Privately, 
he may have conspired with the Asia-First wing of the Republican party and 
sympathized with the Fortress America view of such leaders as Herbert Hoover.24 
2ut publicly the labor leader maintained a circumspect silence. Indeed, at the 
height of the Cold War, Lewis's views on foreign affairs seemed as much an 
enigma as they had been during the 1930s. That he disliked Truman's foreign 
policies was soon a matter of public record. After all, when Truman had com- 
plained that he would not appoint the labor leader national dogcatcher, Lewis 
quipped back: "The President could ill afford to have more brains in the Dog 
Department than in the State Department."% Yet most Americans could not 
really know whether Lewis thought Truman to be too hard or too soft on the 
Soviets. For, by the early 19SOS, the labor leader's closest business associate was 
the entrepreneur-financier Cyrus Eaton, one of America's foremost exponents 
of improved relations with Soviet Russia.z6 Lewis, it seemed, flew simul- 
taneously with the hawks in the "Fortress America" school and the Eaton- 
style doves. 
But as was true during most of Lewis's active public career, domestic devel- 
opments in the coal industry and within his union overwhelmed his thoughts 
about America's role in the world and actual events overseas. In the 1950s coal 
mining entered a period of decline comparable to the 1920s, in which mass un- 
employment afflicted miners. As a resi t ,  the UMWA suffered grievously. 
Competition from oil and natural gas-cheap, plentiful, and clean energy sources- 
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largely explained coal's plight.27 This domestic reality led Lewis during the 
1950s and early sixties to combine isolationism of the Fortress America variety 
I with harsh anti-soviet rhetoric. 
Alone among labor leaders, Lewis criticized United States economic aid to 
Western Europe. Commenting in 1954 on a $100 million loan to the European 
' ' coal and steel community, he &st whined, "It's a moral certainty that that 
8 money will never be paid back." But then he added more pointedly, "We're 
. r 
.building up in Europe with American taxpayers' money a device that is eco- 
. nomically designed to further cripple the American economy and throw Ameri- 
' 8  cans out of work." It was time, Lewis suggested, that the United States stopped 
, l c  building up foreign competitors to the domestic coal industry or encouraging 
I' q[ the nation to rely on imported oil. He even portrayed a scene redolent of the 
cA present. What happens, he asked, if the Soviets sink our tankers en route from 
, ,Venezuela? What happens when they sink modern supertankers coming from 
:.:, 'the ports of the Persian Gulf? And what happens when West Coast oil can't be 
I ' transported to the Northeast? 
, Lewis's answers to those questions were meant to be frightening. The Rus- 
' i sians would demand an American surrender and "thrust their cast iron Oriental 
' . , philosophy down our throats as a nation." To avert that possibility, Lewis rec- 
J .ommended that the United States become less dependent on imported oil and 
dev'lop its own abundant coal deposits as a substitute. Only if the United 
.. $tates kept its domestic house in order, Lewis argued, would it be able to de- 
' fend the "free world." In Lewis's image of world affairs as of 1954, a triumph 
over the oil lobbyists and Rockefeller imperialists would be more important 
than a French military victory at Dien Bien Phu.28 
Seven years later, in a speech before the National Coal Policy Conference, 
Lewis reverted to this theme. Again he criticized the nation's untoward reli- 
ance on oil and natural gas, especially the imported variety, and raised the spec- : 
tre of a Soviet threat to world shipping lanes. If the Russians cut off oil ship- 
ments, he warned, om transportation would be stopped, our railroads would 
not even be able to carry coal to market, and "our economy would collapse." 
And if the economy collapsed, as he prophesied, the Russians would not even ' 
have to invade the United States. In short, to Lewis, coal was vital to national x. 
economic well-being, and domestic prosperity was more important to security r. . 
than foreign military bases.29 
Aside from an occasional resort to Cold-War rhetoric and the spectre of . . 
American dependence on oil, Lewis played a marginal role during the 1950s and emm 
sixties in the public discussion of foreign policy. He gladly entertained visiting 
delegations of foreign labor leaders at UMWA headquarters in Washington, 
and he just as willingly served as a member of honorific United States labor 
. ' 
missions abroad. But unlike other labor leaders, who during the 1950s coopera&' . : . ' 
ted covertly with the CIA and the State Department in opposing communist in- ' 
. . 
I 
, . 
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fluence in Western European trade unions, Lewis refused to participate in such 
programs. Even flattery on the part of high Eisenhower administration bfficials- 
for example, C. D. Jackson's statement that in Lewis's case, "a problem, a proj- 
ect, and a man fitted together perfectly" - failed to budge him.30 Lewis proved 
no more receptive to Kennedy-style cultural diplomacy. Asked to participate in 
a government-sponsored international lecture series on the concept of freedom, 
Lewis replied: "I cannot believe that a cultural program, however virtuous and 
well-managed, will be a controlling factor in the adjustment of world-wide 
problems. I would probably be out of character in lecturing on a subject on 
which, heretofore, I had not been recognized as an authority."31 
What, then, can one conclude about Lewis and his view of America's role in 
the world? First, it can be said without hesitation that, for Lewis, domestic 
concerns always outweighed overseas considerations, and that among domestic 
issues the health of the coal industry and the stability of the UMWA were up- 
permost. That being said, it must be added that Lewis's concept of America 
and the world was comparable to that of such contemporary midwesterners as 
Herbert Hoover, Robert La Follette, George Norris, and Charles Beard. And 
all of them could probably harken back to the young Abraham Lincoln's words 
in 1837, as cited in a recent column by James Reston on Jimmy Carter and Af- 
ghanistan: 
All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined, with all the 
treasure of the earth . . . in their military chest, with a Bonaparte for 
a commander, could not by force take a drink from the Ohio or 
make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years. 
At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I 
answer: if ever it reach us, it must spring up amongst us; it cannot 
come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be 
its author and finisher. As a nation of free men, we must live through- 
out all time or die by suicide.32 * 
NOTES 
I nonald Radosh. Amerkan Labor and United Slates Foreign Policy (New York, 1969); John P. 
Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement, 1940-1953 (Ithaca, 1954); Roy 
Godson, American Labor and European Politin: The AFL as a Tranmationaf Force (New York, 1976). 
2 Ladislas Farrago, The Came ofthe ~ o x e s  (New York, 1971). 351-65; Saul D. Alinsky, John L. 
Lewis: An UnaurhonzedBiography (New York, 1949); 201-03; Hugh Ross, ''John L. Lewis and the 
Election of 1940." Labor History. 17 (spring 1976)~ 160-90. 
3 Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren W. Van Tine. John L. Lewis, A Biosqraphy (New York. 1977). 
52-62. 
R 4 Lee Fressman, "Lee Pressman Transcript," Columbia Oral History Collection, Columbia University, p. 173; United Mine Workers Joumol (hereafter cited as "UMWJ"), March IS, 1941. p. 6. 
5 George G. Moore to John L. Lewis, July 12, 1944. John L. Lewis, M. A. File. United Mine 
Workers of America Archives. Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as "UMWAA"). 
6 Lewis to W. Jett Lauck. April 16 and 30, 1926, W. Jett Lauck Papers. Box 39, Alderson Li- 
brary, University of Virginia. 
7 See John L. Lewis. The Miner's Fight4r Amdcun Stan&& (Indianapolis, 1925). 
8 N w  York Timu, Maroh 16,1937. p. a; UMWJ, April I, 1927, pp. 10-11. 
L 
. 9 W i  Taylor to Lewis. Jan. 27, 1938; Lewis to Taylor. Jan. 29, 1938; Taylor to Lewis. 
' Feb. I, 1938. PU in Comspondence File, 1930-39, UMWAA. 
- 
10 New York Times, Sept. 7, p. 10. Sept. 9. p. a, Sept. 12, p. I, Sept. 27, p. 6, 1938; Ralph Het- 
e l  to Sidmy HiUman, July 25, 1938, CIO Folder, 1938, Sidney Hillman papers, Amalgamated 
. Clothing Workera of America Headprters, New York. And, in Franklin D. Roosevdt Papers, 
, Frankh D. Rooswdt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.: Lewis to Marvin Mclntyre, Nov. 6.1936. Of- 
. . ficial Fit 46A; J o ~ u c  Daniels to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Sept. 9.1938. and Lewis to Roose- 
' 
velt, Sept. 9,1938. Resident's Personal File. 3183. 
11 Alinsky. 201-03; F m g o V  351-65; Marquis Childs, I Write from Washington (New York, 1942), 
' 
174-85; Kmneth Crawford series in P.M., Dce. u, 1940, April z5,28,29,30, and May 5,1941; St. 
, Louis Post-Dirptch, June IS, 1939. 
13 Memorandum from A. D. Lewis, Sept. 9, 1939; memorandum from Lee Rasman to Lewis. 
. Sept. n, 1939; m m ~ ~ n d u m  to Lewis on Ro+ Labor Policy for War Period from Lauck, 
Septa 13.1939; mmmandum to bwis  from Presunu~. %. 27,1939. d in Correspondence File, 
" 1930-39. UMWM, CIO Executive Board Minute, Oct. 6, 5939, CIO Papers, Seaetary-Tr+?6urer's 
, ' *, Box 90, Archives of Labor History and Urban Affairs, Walter Reuther Library, Wayne 
State University. 
I 4 New York Times, Oct. 31, p. 17, Nav. I, p. IS, ~939; Congress of Industrial Organizations. . 
PIocndings, 1939 Convendon, 5-6.106-109, and es-y 17.19; Roasevelt to Lewis, Oct. U, 1939, 
. Ofkkd Pile 2546. Rooswelt Papers; Harold L. Ickes to Lewis, Oft. 16, 1939, John L. Lewis Pa- 
I pen, Microfilm Copy, State Historical Society of Wisconsin. 
15 United Mine Workers of America, Proceedi~~s, 11940 Conurntion, 315. 
16 T r a d p t  of speech before American Youth Congress. Peb. 10,1940, Lewis Papers. 
17 New York Times, Apnl8.1940. p. 4. 
1 M., Jdy 3, pp. I. 7. July 31, p. IS, 1940. 
I, ' 
I 19 UMW], Sept. I, 1940, pp. 12-14. 
- ' 20 Speech Transcript, Oct. 25,1940. Lewis Papers; UMW], Nov. I, 1940, pp. 4-6; New York 
' Times, a. 26,1No,pp. 1.12. 
' ' 21 Dubofsky and Van Tie .  348-50.395-96. 1 22 IM., 4 5 ;  William W. MiIler. "The Response of the United Mine Workers of America to Government Control in World War II"(M.A. thesis. Ohio State University, 1973)~ pp. 1-32. 
. T a1 
Melvyn Dubofsky on Lewis 33 
23 UMWJ, March IS, 1943, p. 18; Dubofsky and Van Tine, 425-40. 
24 Dubofsky and Van Tine, 447-48. 
z5 New York Times, Oct. 6,1950. P. 18. 
7.6 Dubofsky and Van Tine, 506-10,518-19, 524-25. 
:7 Ihid., 494-97. 
18 UMWJ, May I, 19549 pp. 7, 9-10. 
~9 Ihid., April I,  1961. pp. 3, 18-19. 
30 Memorandum, "Re Jackson-Smith-Dulles Luncheon Meeting," June 19,1953; memorandum, 
"Re Jackson-Dulles and Braden Meeting," Oct. 7, 1953; Lewis to C. D. Jackson. Oct. 14, 1953; 
Jackson to Lewis, Nov. 3, 1953; all in John L. Lewis, Personal File, UMWAA. Jackson was a 
special assistant to President Eisenhower and chairman of the Psychological Warfare Board. 
31 Lewis to Frederick A. Colwell, Oct. 12,1961, Lewis, Personal Fie, U M W M .  
32 New York Times, Jan. 30,1980, p. A27. 
Three Faces of Midwestern 0 sol at ion ism: 
Comments 
1 WILL PREFACE my comments with a few observations about the way in 
which I approached the assignment.' Having had ample time to read and re- 
flect upon the papers, I found myself favorably disposed toward all of them. 
Each paper provides a clear description of the principal figure's foreign policy 
views and of the reasons why he arrived at these. There is little reason to quar- 
rel with any of the authors' major arguments. I have taken a cue from Professor 
Doenecke and tried to address some of the questions he raised at the end of his 
paper. That is, I have tried to focus on the socio-economic and ideological en- 
vironment within which the three individuals operated in an attempt to see 
whether they were mavericks or representative figures whose actions reflected 
the presence of deeper forces. My comments will lean heavily toward the latter 
view, though Lewis occasionally is troubling on this point. My interpretation 
of the course taken by agrarian radicals, a view heavily influenced by Michael 
Rogin, appears to differ somewhat from that of Professor Cole, although I do 
not believe that we are too far apart.2 
Midwestern isolationists have bequeathed a puzzling legacy to Americans. 
As these papers ably demonstrate, isolationists were drawn from diverse back- 
grounds. What, after all, is one to make of a phenomenon that included a 
spokesman for agrarian radicalism, the head oflears, Roebuck and Company, 
and the era's most controversial leader of organized labor? While agreeing 
with one another on some issues, these individuals obviously disagreed on others. 
Even the term "isolationism" caused confusion since it provided only a partially 
accurate description of their views.3 
The analyses provided both by contemporary commentators and subsequently 
by academics have muddied the waters further. Occasionally individuals have 
used the term loosely, trying to make it apply when it does not. Any foreign 
policy critic counseling withdrawal is open to the charge of advocating isola- 
t i ~ n i s m . ~  In addition, there is a tendency to understate the ways in which the 
tumultous events of the 1936-54 period altered and eventually reshaped the na- 
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ture of isolationism. Furthermore, one must remember the degree to which 
isolationists' views were influenced by domestic considerations. Individuals 
often had sharply different reasons for supporting a policy of aloofness. As con- 
ditions changed, they no longer were in agreement about foreign affairs. Any 
analysis of isolationism, therefore, must move beyond an acknowledgment of 
surface similarities to an examination of the social, economic, and political roots 
of these views. For the most part, it seems to me that these papers have suc- 
ceeded in this task.5 
In spite of their many differences, Nye, Wood, and Lewis agreed on two ma- 
jor points, ones which initially gave an element of cohesiveness to midwestern 
isolationism. First, they insisted that neither America's national security nor its 
material well-being was dependent upon European or Asian events. The prob- 
ability that a foreign power could conduct a successful transoceanic invasion al- 
ways hovered around zero. Although the advent of air power created a more 
realistic threat, isolationists insisted that no nation could inflict massive de- 
struction upon the United States through bomber raids. These individuals also 
denied that access to European and Asian markets and raw materials was neces- 
sary to insure American prosperity. The existence of a vast internal market 
combined with the availability of western hemispheric trade was sufficient to 
guarantee a stable domestic economy. One should note that most isolationists 
thought in terms of an insular hemisphere rather than an insular nation, a fact 
that has to alter somewhat the connotation of "isolationism." Mexicans, for 
example, would be hard-pressed to believe that Wood's definition of an accepta- 
ble foreign policy meant that America was a non-interyentionist power. Never- 
theless, one essential aspect of the isolationist world view was that, within 
limits, Americans did not have to worry about the rest of the globe. 
The second major point of isolationist belief was that US involvement in a 
foreign war would have a devastating impact at home. Though isolationists 
often had different versions of the types of disasters that a war would bring. 
nearly all agreed that participation in another overseas conflict would lead to the 
destruction of American democracy. At the very least, war would result in the 
total eclipse of Congress by the president and in the adoption of policies that 
would revolutionize the nation's economic and social system. 
Midwestern isolationists, however, traveled very different roads in arriving at 
these conclusions. They represented distinct, and at times antagonistic, groups. 
I would suggest that, during the 193os, there were three isolationist traditions, 
that these changed significantly over a fifteen-year period, and that, in the final 
analysis, the differences were more significant than the original surface similari- 
ties. The papers have dealt perceptively with two of these tendencies, which is 
understandable since these probably were the dominant ones in the midwest. 
For the sake of comprehensiveness, I will discuss briefly the third tradition in 
a m ~ m e n t . ~  
k Frederick Adams: Midwestern Isolationism 37 , For the lack of a better term, the first tendency m i ~ h t  be called the liberal- - 
labor one. This tradition drew upon two quite dikerent bases of support, ones 
that shifted in strength over time. Historically, agrarian radicalism was the ma- 
jor element of the liberal-labor camp, and it remained strong during the 1930s. 
Gerald Nye obviously was a representative of this viewpoint. As Professor Cole 
has shown, Nye's major concern was the farmer's struggle against eastern finan- 
cial and industrial interests. From the late nineteenth century into the 194os, 
agrarian radicals insisted that industrialists and bankers exploited rural America, 
robbing farmers of their just rewards. They also believed that these same forces 
advocated foreign wars in order to protect and expand their overseas interests. 
Foreign conflicts, moreover, would result in domestic policies that aided cor- 
porations and banks as well as caused the death of large numbers of farm boys 
turned soldiers and sailors. In short, overseas entanglements benefited agrarian 
radicals' domestic opponents. 
Another important aspect of their position was a bitter hostility to imperial- 
ism, which they believed was primarily the product of industrial and financial 
capitalist greed. They were especially incensed by British imperialism, both be- 
cause of its exploitive nature and because of the influence British financial in- 
stitutions seemed to exert over Wall Street. Their attitude also caused them to 
oppose any American attempts at overseas annexation. Consequently, it is 
hardly surprising to find that agrarian radicals argued against American entrance 
into another European or Asian war, particularly if by so doing the US found 
itself propping up Britain's empire.' 
To a degree, John L. Lewis represented the other element of the liberal-labor 
camp. The experience of World War I and its aftermath had a profound in- 
fluence on labor leaders. Professor Dubofsky has carefully dmdbed Lewis's bit- 
ter recollection of those years. Despite its support of the war effort. labor was 
thrown on the defensive in 1919-20. Nbt only did Lewis come under attack 
from his traditional conservative foes, but he also found that the federal govern- 
ment swung anti-labor by issuing injunctions and presidential edicts against his 
union and by even tapping his telephone. m n g  the massive labor unrest of 
1919, the government forced a settlement upon the UMWA. In a fashion simi- 
lar to that of Nye, Lewis concluded that wars enabled corporate leaders to in- 
crease their power and to control government policy. In addition, workers, not 
business managers, would do most of the fighting. For Lewis, isolationism was 
in the best interests of the American working class.' 
While the first strain of middle western isolationism drew upon a liberal- 
labor base, the second grew out of conservative business sources. General 
was a leading spokesman for this viewpoint. As Prohsor Doenecke has described 
at some length in his informative book, Not to the Swifi, businessmen involved 
in mining, service areas, retailing, and light goods manufacturing were inclined 
to believe in national self-sufficiency. F~thermore,  they became leery of the 
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New Deal in the late 193Os, when they thought it was heading in a socialist di- 
rection. These individuals feared that participation in a foreign war would 
destroy capitalism by tipping the internal balance of power to advanced New 
Dealers. Like other conservatives of this type, Wood developed a nearly patho- 
logical fear that US involvement in a European conflict would reproduce within 
this country all of the class strife and hatred that plagued the Old World. Op- 
posing both British imperialism and Soviet communism, conservative mid- 
western businessme~l clung to a view of American innocence and exception- 
alism: somehow the US had not developed the class cleavages of European so- 
cieties. Doubtless the domestic unrest that began in 1937 heightened their fears 
of internal conflict. In any event, they became increasingly shrill in their warn- 
ings of the disastrous impact that overseas involvement would have on America's 
social ~ t ruc ture .~  
At least two important differences existed between these strains of isolation- 
ism, and they were of suacient magnitude to make a stable, long-lasting co- 
alition unlikely. First, the groups obviously represented sharply distinct social 
bases. Liberal-labor isolationists had mass support, especially among agrarian 
radicals, and could thus muster considerable electoral impact, while the conser- 
vative position was primarily that of an elite who relied upon pressure group 
tactics to exert influence. Second, the two groups had opposite views on the 
proper role of the federal government. On  the one hand, liberal-labor elements 
believed that state intervention was necessary to regulate the activities of large 
corporate and financial institutions, to protect the interests of farmers and la- 
borers, and to enact necessary social reforms. They worried that America's par- 
ticipation in a foreign war would destroy any chance for success in these ven- 
tures. On  the other hand, conservative midwestern businessmen became bitter 
foes of governmental regulations and feared that the New Deal was the opening 
wedge for socialism or worse. By 1940-41, many thought that Roosevelt was 
trying to maneuver the country into war in order to aid the left-liberal cause. 
The groups, thus, were natural enemies, with each convinced that Roosevelt's 
foreign policy would aid its opponents. 
The third element in midwestern isolationism was an ethnic one. Where the 
other groups were concerned about the domestic implications of foreign policy, 
ethnic isolationists were primarily interested in foreign events. Irish, German, 
and Russian-German middle Westerners saw Britain as their traditional enemy. 
They had opposed America's entrance into World War I and reacted in a simi- 
lar fashion when a new European crisis seemed in the offing. In many ways in- 
nately conservative, they were anticommunist and did not wish to aid the So- 
viet Union. For some ethnic isolationists, furthermore, a strong Germany 
sdrved as a bulwark against the spread of Russian and British influence.I0 
Midwestern isolationism, therefore, consisted of a number of discrete ele- 
ments which at best were in uneasy alliance. This arrangement was a fluid 
one that could shift in response to changing circumstances at home and abroad. 
During the crisis conditions of the late 1930s and the 1940s' an important re- 
alignment took place. The papers suggest this dynamic quality. General Wood 
withdrew his support for the New Deal and began moving to the right. By the 
early IgSos, he was a supporter of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Likewise, Senator 
Nye moved steadily rightward into the McCarthy camp. Lewis became a harsh 
critic of Roosevelt and Truman, but not to the point of indulging in red-baiting 
tactics at home and rabidly antiSoviet posturing abroad. What is the signifi- 
cance of these shifts? Do they indicate anything about the changing nature of 
isolationism? 
To make sense of them, one must remember the highly charged environment 
of the late 1930s and the 1940s. These were years in which foreign and domes- 
tic events became closely intertwined and identified with each other. As Arno J. 
Mayer contends, it was an era of international revolution and counterrevolution 
played out across and within national boundaries. By weakening the moderate 
forces of accommodation, the crisis conditions had a polarizing impact that al- 
tered the complexion of midwestern isolationism. Some individuals became 
supporters of Henry Wallace's campaign for the Century of the Common Man 
while others moved logically into the conservative ranks behind McCarthy.11 
Beginning in 1937, if not earlier, a combination of domestic and foreign 
events produced this transformation. Creating powerful internal tensions were 
Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court; the mounting controversy 
over labor relations, especially in light of the wave of sit-down strikes; the re- 
cession of 1937-38, which suggested both that the New Deal had failed and that 
additional welfare measures were necessary; and Roosevelt's bid to purge the 
Democratic party of conservatives in 1938. Quring this same period, the inter- 
national situation rapidly deteriorated as fascist powers expanded. Taken to- 
gether, these conditions produced a highly volatile environment.1a 
The war years added to these tensions. Convinced of the need for bolder do- 
mestic programs, liberal-labor supporters sowht an expanded New Deal. In 
I943 the National Resources Planning Board, headed by Harvard economist 
Alvin Hansen, published a report calling upon the federal government to as- 
sume responsibility for maintaining prosperity in the postwar era by pursuing 
expansionist monetary and fiscal policies. Government spending, moreover, 
could solve such social ills as poor housing. inadequate medical facilities, urban 
decay, and inferior educational opportunities. Though not anticapitalist, the 
left-liberal program would curb corporate influence by increasing government 
power and forcing greater competition. Organized labor also made important 
gains during the war and moved in an explicitly political direction with the for- 
mation of the CIO's Political Action Committee. The left wing of the labor 
movement could provide important supErt for programs like those outlined in 
the N.R.P.B. report. Though still sm;tll, the Communist Party of America 
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reached peak strength at this time. Its members held influential positions in 
several CIO unions, and the party was pledged to joining with left-liberals in a 
united front against fascism. O n  the international level, liberal-labor groups 
championed an alliance with the Soviet Union in behalf of a war to destroy 
fascism and to usher in a new era of worldwide reform.13 
With his advocacy of the People's Century, Henry Wallace was the most 
prominent national spokesman for the left-liberal cauw. In many ways Wallace 
represented a fusing of traditional agrarian radicalism with urban liberalism. In 
domestic affairs he advocated the social liberalism, including a commitment to 
civil rights, that was embodied in the left-liberal position. Once an isolationist, 
he recommended that the United States take the lead in dismantling old-world 
imperialism and in instituting economic policies that would bridge the gap be- 
tween wealthy and poor nations. He firmly believed that close ties with the So- 
viet Union were essential for world peace. According to Wallace, the US and 
USSR were becoming more like one another as America began to enact social 
reforms and as Russia allowed increased political freedom.'' 
The same forces that moved Wallace to the left drove conservative isolation- 
ists like General Wood to the right. Until the late 1930% Wood viewed the 
New Deal as a moderate attempt to  restore stability. After that point he be- 
came fearful that Roosevelt was going to lead the country to socialism. Like 
Robert Taft and other influential~conservatives, Wood was convinced that the 
paramount dangers facing the country were internal ones. Liberal-labor advo- 
cacy of new reforms at home and cooperation with the Soviet Union abroad 
heightened conservative apprehensions about the subversive nature of advanced 
New Dealers. By 1950 Wood was prepared to support McCarthy even though 
he might dislike some of the senator's antics. Most conservative midwestern 
isolationists made a similar decision, as Professor Doenecke has demonstrated 
elsewhere.15 
The path traveled by Senator Nye was less straightforward than that of Wood, 
a fact that raises certain questions. Did Nye represent the logical outcome of 
agrarian radicalism? Did populism give way to McCarthyism, as some have 
charged? I am persuaded by Michael Rogin that this did not happen, that 
McCarthy drew his main backing from the conservative wing of the midwes- 
tern Republican party and from various ethnic groups that were troubled by in- 
ternational communism. What happened in the case of Nye was that he be- 
came conservative. According to Rogin, in 1938 Nye campaigned as a progres- 
sive and received support from the traditionally liberal areas of the state. He did 
poorly among Russian-Germans. In the 1944 primary, he ran as a conservative 
isolationist. This time he carried the Russian-German counties but lost in the 
rural counties where agrarian radicalism remained strong. These same counties 
later supported the Farmers Union movement that was sympathetic to Wallace 
and tended more to Soviet-philia than Soviet-phobia. Agrarian radicals' appro- 
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val of Wallace was consistent with their historic opposition to industrial and fi- 
nancial dominance and to imperialism, as well as their desire for expanded gov- 
ernmental powers to aid those exploited by capitalism.16 
There remains the question of what to do with John L. Lewis. One cannot 
easily use him as a representative figure. He remained a bitter critic of Roose- 
velt, but in this he was nearly alone among labor leaders. I am uncertain what 
his opinion was of Wallace and the campaign for the People's Century. He may 
have disliked both of them." Nevertheless, there seems to have been some sim- 
ilarity of purpose between Lewis and Wallace with respect to aiding left-labor 
groups in Latin America. Professor Dubofsky has shown how Lewis maneu- 
vered to strengthen left-leaning Mexican labor leaders. Part of his objective was 
to assist the reform-oriented Cardenas government in its struggle for greater 
economic nationalism. Wallace displayed a comparable concern with encour- 
aging Latin American socio-economic reforms when he was head of the Board 
of Economic Warfare. He wanted to make American purchases of hemispheric 
raw materials contingent upon the recipient nation improving the wages and 
working conditions of labor. In spirit and sympathy, Lewis may not have been 
too far out of step with Wallace.1~ 
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s. therefore, midwestern isolationism under- 
went important changes, with the liberal-labor experience being the most di- 
verse. Though the agrarian radical component remained strong during the pre- 
war period, its influence declined thereafter as its social-economic base shrank. 
Agrarian radicals, moreover, had sharply different reactions to the shifting con- 
ditions. Some followed the path of Nye to conservatism: they opposed domes- 
tic reform and supported McCarthy. Others remained true to  their older prin- 
ciples, becoming supporters of Wallace. As such, they often were highly criti- 
cal of America's Cold War policy. Instead of arguing that the US should re- 
main aloof from the rest of the world, however, they emphasized the necessity 
of improving relations with the Soviet Union; and they supported international 
relief organizations. George McGovern seems agontemporary representative of 
this tradition. Finally, some agrarian radicals supported the administration's 
Cold War policy. l9 Most of organized labor, the other major segment of pre- 
war liberal-labor isolationism, eventually adopted a similar stance, especially fol- 
lowing the CIO purges. Hence individuals such as Hubert Humphrey com- 
bined with union leaders to favor containment, a position that had the unin- 
tended result of playing into the hands of the right at home.20 
Conservative and ethnic isolationists responded in a more uniform manner to 
the crisis conditions. They moved to the right, becoming increasingly vitupera- 
tive in their denunciations of spreading Soviet influence and of internal subver- 
sion. The careers of Wood and Nye reflect the way in which these two strains 
of isolationism converged, thereby creating tbe necessary conditions for a move- 
ment such as McCarthyism. By the early I~SOS, the interlocking questions of 
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11 revolution and counterrevolution abroad and of reform and reaction at home ,, 
' 8  
had transformed middle western isolationism. The liberal-labor wing war di- :% 
I 1  I vidcd and on the defensive, whereas a conservative, super-nationalist wing was - 
I able to have an important il~fluence on both foreign and domestic affairs.21 !v 
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Between the Wars: The Intellectual Climate 
of American Foreign Relations 
WHEN THE GUNS fell silent on the Western Front in November, 1918, 
American power, actual and potential, dominated the European scene. At the 
Versailles Conference, for the first time in history, an American diplomatist be- 
came a major arbiter in the affairs of the world. Historically, nations that dic- 
tated a peace carried the responsibility for its preservation. Because power and 
interests shift through time, the great treaties of history seldom survived the 
generations that created them. To  perpetuate what they had wrought at Ver- 
sailles, the victorious democracies had no choice but to integrate American 
power and leadership permanently into European politics. This challenge to 
national performance had not escaped American scholars and statesmen during 
the war's final months as they contemplated a proper postwar role for the Uni- 
ted States in European affairs. Those concerned with world order had long 
identified American interests with international stability; in the future, they 
agreed, the United States, as the world's leading power, could not avoid com- 
mitments to preserve what mattered in the postwar treaty structure. 
Those who advocated continued American leadership in world affairs had 
two policy concepts before them. One would seek to preserve the framework 
of the international system- the balance of power, employing force if nece&ary 
to prevent major changes in the established hierarchy of power while permit- 
ting a myriad of minor changes to occur under the assumption that not all 
change challenged the security or welfare of the United States. This approach 
to world order demanded essentially that the country maintain, in alliance with 
Britain and France, the preponderance of power that had triumphed over Ger- 
many. As the war approached its end, American diplomatist Lewis Einstein 
warned the government and people of the United States: "At no time even un- 
known to us, were European politics a matter of indifference to our vital in- 
terests, but if hitherto we were impotent to alter their march, a fortunate des- 
tiny preserved the existing balance independently of us . . . . W e  have today a 
distinct and legitimate duty in the family of great nations in contributing to 
preserve those elements which compose thsbalance of power, and to which we 
can only be blind at our later cost."' To  sustain Europe's new equilibrium 
Norman A. Graebner is Stettinius Professor of Modern American History, University of Virginia. 
4s 
46 MIDWESTERN ISOLATIONISM 
I American policy would of necessity avoid the extreme goals of escaping all obli- 
gations abroad or identifying the nation's interests with the cause of humanity 
everywhere. Rather, postwar policy would attempt to define and protect a 
wide variety of specific historic and geographical interests in competition with 
peoples who would pursue traditional interests of their own with whatever 
means came to hand. 
Another group, far more dominant in the country's foreign policy elite, pre- 
ferred to place the nation's interest in world stability not on the altar of power 
but on the altar of human reason. This group looked less to precise, tangible 
I 
goals, to be pursued through force and diplomacy, than to abstract, reasoned 
1 objectives such as peace and peaceful change, order, justice, and self-determina- 
I I  tion. Any world environment in which such purposes emerged triumphant 
I would indeed serve the American interest admirably. Against such bulwarks of stability and the status quo, nations could alter the established order of power, 
or even the world's territorial arrangements, little if at all. For this foreign pol- 
icy elite it seemed proper that the United States should take the lead in the 
twentieth-century search for non-power devices, such as arbitration and concili- 
ation, a world court or a league of nations, as the only legitimate means for set- 
I tling international disputes. Woodrow Wilson, who emerged in 19x6 as the 
primary spokesman for American internationalism, sought above all to erase the 
historic notion that world stability rested on superior power committed to its 
defense, and to attach the status quo to "a general association of nati~ns . . . 
[that would offer] mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small states alike."2 
1 ;  President Wilson waged his public war on secret diplomacy, the balance of 
I power, and the concept of national interest- three fundamental accoutrements 
of power politics-with sufficient suecess to eliminate them from the main cur- 
rents of American thought, but without removing them from world politics. 
I The great debate on League membership in 1919 ignored almost totally the con- 
cepts of interest, equilibrium, and alliance; it terminated abruptly all United 
States commitments to Europe. The country withdrew its power from the con- 
tinent in the conviction either that the decisions made at Versailles, including 
the establishment of the League of Nations, would maintain world stability, or 
that any future breakdown of the peace need not concern the United States. 
Europe's recent experience had challenged the validity of both assumptions. 
What promised a new age of competence in the conduct of foreign relations, 
with its corresponding guarantee of peace, was the anticipated democratization 
of diplomacy. Even in democratic states external affairs traditionally evolved 
outside the boundaries of legitimate public discourse. Foreign offices had deter- 
mined the world's foreign policies; the masses could judge but not control 
them. After 194, however, the failure of Europe's officialdom to prevent the 
Great War discredited the old diplomacy; never again would foreign relations 
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be the exclusive preserve of the professionals. The human sacrifice which the 
Great War had levied made it clear that future decisions would have public sup- 
port or fail. In the United States the constitutional division of powers permitted, 
even encouraged, public and congressional discussion of external policies. Still, 
the perennial debates before 1914 had never engaged the American public in any 
systematic study of foreign affairs. After Versailles Western writers and states- 
men anticipated the emergence of an educated public, prepared to exert its in- 
fluence in behalf of a peaceful future. Democratically-controlled policies would 
be responsible; they would limit governmental actions to what the public re- 
garded decent and proper. Elihu Root, elder statesman of the Republican party, 
promulgated this encouraging view of the public in the first issue of Foreign 
AJain in 1922: 
When foreign offices were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the 
danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are 
ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs. 
The world will be the gainer by the change, for, while there is no 
human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a hu- 
man way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. 
That way is to furnish the whole people, as a part of their ordinary 
education, with correct information about their relations to other 
peoples, about the limitations upon their rights, about their duties 
to respect the rights of others, about what has happened and is hap- 
pening in international affairs, and about the effects upon national 
life of the things that are done or refused,as between nations; so that 
the people themselves will have the means to test misinformation 
and appeals to prejudice and passion based upon error.' 
* This vision of an informed nation, conscious of its interests and those of other 
peoples, exerting its will through democratic procedures, was an appealing one. 
"There is no guarantee of peace," declared Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, 
"like the guarantee which springs from the common sense of the people in 
those matters which contribute to peace or war."' Unfortunately the notion 
that public-based policies would attain unprecedented levels of wisdom and re- 
sponsibility expected too much of both governmental and educative processes. 
Public opinion could neither formulate nor execute external policy; the public 
possessed no voice or institution through which it could act. Only with a 
widely distributed and understandable body of knowledge could it even discuss 
external issues intelligently. Where the .country's citizens would secure that 
knowledge was nowhere apparent; they would be no wiser than the public of- 
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ficials and editors who instructed them. What troubled Root was the prospect 
that not all individuals who wielded influence would practice restraint, that po- 
litical demagogues would seek popularity and newspapers would seek additional 
circulation by insulting foreign countries and involving the public politically 
and emotionally in external matters that transcended the historical interests of 
the United States and thereby defied the creation of genuine p o l i ~ y . ~  
Practicing politicians, sharing the post-Versailles euphoria, with its central 
assumption that power politics had vanished from international life, would 
logically deny that conditions abroad necessitated any special American respon- 
sibility for the maintenance of order. This welcome denial would merely rein- 
force the public's distrust of traditional diplomacy, its assumption of America's 
moral superiority, its disinterest in foreign commitments, and its preference for 
avoiding rather than facing the recurring challenges to international stability. 
At the same time the universal concern for peace would encourage opinion 
makers to exaggerate the importance, even the unique morality, of the status 
quo. It was true that any major disturbance of the treaty structure could en- 
danger regional if not world stability. Still, the appealing conviction that only 
peaceful change could be legitimate would burden diplomacy not with the tra- 
ditional management of change but with its total elimination. The only defense 
against such forms of overexpectation lay in the public's capacity to recognize 
and resist them. Unfortunately, the American people possessed no special com- 
petence to judge. Any national approach to world affairs that offered leadership 
without commitment would command overwhelming public approval. 
American universities met the challenge of creating an informed, discerning 
public by introducing the new studies of diplomatic history and international 
politics. From the beginning the new intellectual efforts were utopian. Even 
as those engaged in them pursued projects designed to perpetuate the peace, 
they ignored the persistence of power politics in history and in the world around 
them. What dominated their thought was the Great War and their passionate 
desire to  avoid the recurrence of such a catastrophe. It was not strange that 
wishing and generalization prevailed over any analysis of the ongoing realities 
of international life. The end of lasting and universal peace overwhelmed the 
problem of means. Woodrow Wilson once quieted the doubts of his adver- 
saries who questioned the effectiveness of the League with the assurance: "If it 
won't work, it must be made to work."6 Schemes guaranteeing a new inter- 
national order, devoted largely to the task of rendering the League of Nations 
more effective, did not require explanations of how they would work simply 
because the consequences of failure were too disastrous to contemplate. This 
propensity of laudable purposes to  cloud the importance of means led the econo- 
mist Alfred Marshall, in another context, to compare utopian programs to the 
"bold facility of the weak player who will speedily solve the most difficult chess 
problems by taking on himself to move the black men as well as the white."' 
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Americans, whether isolationists or internationalists, shared a deep concern 
for the peace and stability of post-Versailles Europe. What separated them was 
their perceptions of a desirable and necessary role for the United States in a 
peaceful and promising international order. For isolationists nothing in the na- 
tion's experience dictated the necessity of a permanent or continuous American 
involvement in European politics. The widespread disillusionment with the 
war itself merely reinforced this conviction. Too many Americans had expected 
too much of victory. Not satisfied with the preservation of the traditional order 
of power, they anticipated no less than President Wilson had promised-a new 
order, free of all assaults on peace and democracy. The disillusionment quickly 
focused on the country's wartime associates, Britain and France, whose leaders 
had warred so effectively on American neutrality and now refused to pay their 
countries' wartime debts to the United States. The powerful newspaper pub- 
lisher William Randolph Hearst reminded his readers that Britain had often 
been the target of American patriotism. Unable to discern any demonstrable 
gains from their wartime efforts, millions of Americans entered the 1920s deter- 
mined to avoid all future European involvements. "We ask only to live our 
own life in our own way," declared California's Hiram W. Johnson in March, 
1922, "in friendship and sympathy with all, in alliance with none."B For In- 
diana's Albert J. Beveridge the country's "divinely ordained mission [was] to 
develop and exercise, by friendship to all and partnership with none, a moral 
influence circling the globe."9 
Isolationists recognized no danger to the nation's interests in their advocacy 
of American political and military detachment &om Europe. Europe's prob- 
lems, they charged, were not the concern of the United States; nor did the 
country carry any responsibility for Europe's peace. Isolationism would not 
prevent another European war; it would enable the United States to avoid it. 
Indeed, argued Beveridge, the European powerPwould carefully avoid m y  ac- 
I tion that might involve the United States in their future conflicts. "After the 
incredible blunder of the German High Command in attacking us and thus 
forcing us into war," he asked, "does anybody imagine that any other nation 
hereafter at war with another nation will repeat that tragic folly?"*@ Isolation- 
ists admitted that the United States was not isolated from Europe commercially 
or intellectually; they insisted simply that the country could avoid the quarrels, 
intrigues, poiitics, ambitions, and animosities which had driven other coun- 
I tries to war for centuries. 
Isolationists centered their attack on the League of Nations, a program for 
I peace at once too ambitious and too threatening to national sovereignty. If the / United States entered the League, declared Riram Johnson, "I must abandon 
I the lessons of my youth, which until this moment have been the creed of my 
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manhood, of American ideals, American principles, and American patriotism." 
Borah's distrust of the League was equally profound. To submit a vital issue to 
the decision of foreign powers, he complained, was nothing less than moral 
treason. As the Senate's leading proponent of isolationism, Borah insisted that 
he did not oppose cooperation with other nations. "What I have opposed from 
the beginning." he declared, "is any commitment of this nation to a given line 
of procedure in a future exigency, the facts as to which could not be known be- 
fore the event." Congressman Ogden L. Mills of New York agreed that effec- 
tive cooperation did not require prior commitments. "We believe," he said, 
"that the United States can better serve by maintaining her independence of 
action than by pooling her influence in advance."ll Such isolationists never ex- 
plained how the country could prepare for an emergency unless it had ordered 
its affairs with such possible exigencies in mind. Borah deniec3 that cooperation 
and independence were incompatible. By setting a good example and limiting 
cooperation to voluntary behavior, the United States could exercise effective 
world leadership. For Borah, however, the United States could exert that lea- 
dership only if it stayed out of European affairs. "I do not think we can have 
here a great, powerful, independent, self-governing republic," he said, "and do 
anything else. I do not think it is possible for us to continue to be the leading 
intellectual and moral power in the world and do anything else."12 
Anti-League sentiments controlled President Harding's policies toward Eu- 
rope. At a celebration of his election at Marion, Ohio. Harding delivered his 
obituary to the League. "You didn't want a surrender of the U.S.A.," he re- 
minded his fellow townsmen, "you wanted America to go on under American 
ideals. That's why you didn't care for the League which is now deceased."l' In 
his inaugural Harding declared that the United States was "ready to associate 
with the nations of the world, great and small, for conference and counsel . . . 
[and] to participate in suggesting plans for mediation, conciliation, and arbitra- 
tion." For Borah, Harding's commitment to associate was unnecessarily dan- 
gerous to the country's freedom of action. His verdict conformed to the na- 
tion's mood; thereafter the Republican administration exercised greater care. 
Until 1923 it refused to answer League communications. Shortly before his 
death that year Harding remarked: "I have no unseemly comment to offer on 
the League. If it is serving the world helpfully, more power to it. But it is not 
for us. The Senate has so declared, the Executive has so declared, the people 
have so declared. Nothing could be more decisively stamped with finality."l4 
Apparently the anti-League forces had triumphed. 
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Internationalism in the 1920s encompassed the pro-League forces who in- 
sisted that the United States redeem its pledges to the past and the future. 
League proponents, unlike the isolationists, argued that the United States would 
not avoid a future European war. Therefore the country would fulfill its obli- 
gation to its own and the world's peace by preventing, not merely by escaping, 
a breakdown of the peace. For editor Hamilton Holt, writing in The Indepen- 
dent, the single issue before the American people was whether or not the United 
States would play its part "in substituting cooperation for competition in inter- 
national affairs [by joining the League]."ls John Eugene Harley, professor of 
political science at the University of Southern California, explained that the 
League would maintain international order by making international law the 
rule of conduct. To achieve this purpose the League might require sanctions, 
but not war. "The desire for order as expressed by the public opinion of the 
world," he wrote, "is the true and ultimate force which will sustain the League 
in the effort to maintain order through international law."" Raymond B. Fos- 
dick, briefly Under Secretary-General of the League and thereafter a New York 
lawyer, predicted in I920 that the League would prevent war by making com- 
pulsory all the forces for peace that were absent in 1914-delay, discourse, arbi- 
tration, and law." He, no less than others, assumed that all countries would 
follow League rules, that argument would dictate behavior, that governments, 
having argued the issues, would ultimately prefer any settlement to war. Should 
a crisis demand League intervention to prevent aggression, the Council, as a last 
resort, would recommend military force. But membership would not obligate 
any country to enter military or naval action.18 
If League membership carried no military obligations, then its power to pre- 
vent aggression was moral or nonexistent. Indeed, it was the League's reliance 
on moral force that made American adherence* essential. Specifically, inter- 
nationalists agreed, United States membership would guarantee the League its 
needed effectiveness by increasing its prestige and its command of world opin- 
ion, the only genuine foundation of peace. "The League lives by and through 
public opinion," noted author G. Lowes Dickinson reminded readers of The 
New Republic in October, 1923. "It has practically no other power. To refuse 
to mobilize this opinion, to damp it down, to pretend that it does not exist, is in 
effect to destroy ij."19 Yale economist Irving Fisher argued that United States 
adherence to the League would give the organization the moral influence it re- 
quired to sustain international order. This country, he explained, was the 
world's "greatest reserve of moral power, with ideals . . . more unselfish than 
those of other countries and therefore [able,to] exert a special moral influence 
against the ill-conceived and little restrained European scramble for spoils."20 
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Internationalists attributed the apparent successes of the League in the early 
1920s to the growing force of world opinion. Fosdick noted in The Atlantic of 
August, 1922, that the League had settled the boundary dispute between Yugo- 
slavia and Albania. "The method was effective," he wrote, "not because it rep- 
resented force, but because it had behind it the moral judgment of civilization." 
Again Fosdick attributed Italy's retreat from Corfu in 1923 to the opinion of 
mankind, given cohesion and force by the League of Nations. Fisher arrived at 
the same conclusion. The small states, he wrote, "made their protests vocifer- 
ously in the Assembly of the League, and public opinion throughout the world 
was quickly mobilized against Italy."21 Internationalists pondered the addi- 
tional triumphs which the moral leadership of the United States might have 
broudht to the League. Franklin D.  Roosevelt observed as early as August, 
1920, that, except for the American rejection of League membership, Poland 
would not be fighting the Russians with its back to the wall. Had the United 
States entered the League, Fisher argued in 1924, "war would be outlawed, uni- 
versal disarmament would be no longer a dream, and reparations and debts and 
balanced budget and currency stabilization and gigantic standing armies would 
be problems solved or on their way to solution."2~ 
Still Republican leaders, following Harding's death, remained adamantly op- 
posed to League membership. O n  October 23, 1924, President Coolidge ex- 
plained his party's foreign policy. "We have," he averred, "a well defined for- 
eign policy, known to all men who will give it candid consideration. It has as 
its foundation peace with independence. W e  have abstained from joining the 
League of Nations mainly for the purpose of avoiding political entanglements 
and committing ourselves to the assumption of the obligations of others, which 
have been created without our authority and in which we have no direct in- 
terest."= By 1924 the Coolidge administration had inaugurated a policy of co- 
operation with the League's humanitarian ventures. The president acknowledged 
the role of the United States in formulating the Dawes Plan of 1924 on German 
reparations. Under Republican leadership, observed Secretary of State Charles 
Evans Hughes, the United States had achieved much for peace and humanity 
without entangling or injurious commitments. At its 1924 convention the Re- 
publican party reaffirmed Coolidge's decision to avoid League membership. 
"The Government," declared its platform, "has definitely refused membership 
in the League of Nations, and to assume any obligation under the Covenant of 
the League. O n  this we stand." The United States, continued the platform, 
would maintain both its independence and its concern for other nations "through 
cooperation without entangling alliances."24 So thoroughly did Coolidge's vic- 
tory reflect public approval of Republican foreign policy that the Democratic 
party dropped the League issue completely. The Republican conquest of the 
nation's mind on matters of external affairs was complete. 
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Consigned by adverse opinion to failure on the League issue, internationalists 
seized upon World Court membership as an alternate approach to effective in- 
ternational cooperation. Eventually the Court battle comprised the most deter- 
mined internationalist counterattack of the decade. When in May, 1922, the 
Court officially opened for business, the noted American international law ex- 
pert, John Bassett Moore, was among its eleven judges. Many anti-League Re- 
publicans such as Elihu Root shared the confidence of pro-League leaders in the 
World Court. Secretary of State Hughes pressed Harding to submit the ques- 
tion of Court membership to the Senate. To satisfy congressional isolationists, 
he suggested four reservations which would absolve the United States of all 
commitments to the League but would demand for the United States all powers 
on the Court enjoyed by League members. Harding proposed membership to 
Congress on these terms as early as February. 1923, but Borah, as chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, opposed the plan as an overcommit- 
ment of American power and prestige to the League cau~e .~s  Both major par- 
ties endorsed Court membership in their I924 platforms. Still anti-League iso- 
lationists in the Senate continued to stall, convinced that adherence to the World 
Court, a creation of the League, would gradually entrap the United States in 
the League itself. Coolidge argued for Court membership in his March, 1925, 
inaugural. "The weight of our enormous influence," he declared, "must be cast 
upon the side of a reign not of force, but of law and trial, not by battle, but by 
reason."26 Finally, in December, 1925, when the issue of Court membership 
had won the support of peace societies, women's clubs, pro-League forces, 
countless mass meetings, and much of the press, the Senate agreed to act. Early 
in 1926 it approved membership by a vote of 76 to 17. To forestall an assault on 
the question of advisory opinions, Senator Claude A. Swanson of Virginia in- 
troduced a fifth reservation, which denied the Court the right to render an ad- 
visory opinion on any question touching the iwrests of the United States.2' In 
response the Court demanded the right to impose reservations of its own. Coo- 
lidge acknowledged the impasse and, in November, 1926, announced that Uni- 
ted States membership in the World Court had become a dead issue. 
Unfortunately, the World Court, without compulsory jurisdiction or means 
of enforcement, was scarcely the agency to settle issues on which hinged the fu- 
ture of peace and war. Thus the great debate over Court membership which 
raged across the nation during the mid-twenties bore little relation to the reali- 
ties of world politics. Court proponents viewed membership simply as a matter 
of moral obligation- the obligation of the country to support any movement or 
institution that contributed to peace. The New York World voiced the con- 
victions of many editors when it declared: ,"President Harding's recommenda- 
tion represents the shortest step forward that could be taken in the way of meet- 
ing the nation's moral obligation to sustain the peace of the world." During 
the final Senate debates over membership. Swanson argued characteristically: "I 
am strongly persuaded from every moral consideration . . . that we should ad- 
here to this World Court."28 United States membership, argued Irving Fisher, 
would strengthen the Court's influence. "The Court has no sheriff except pub- 
lic opinion," he declued. "America's adhesion would double its authority in 
the minds of men. "29 
What made United States membership so appealing was the Court's alleged 
capacity, magdied by American support, to assert the primacy of law over 
force. The Federal Cowcil of Churches of Christ in America appealed to its 
member congregations, "Pray and speak for the extension of the sway of law 
over force and for the wholehearted readiness on the part of our nation to play 
its part in bringing this about." By joining the World Court, Harding assured 
a St. Louis audience in July, 1923, the United States would promote the substi- 
tution of wreamn for prejudke, law for obduracy, and justice for passion . . . ."m 
Fisher reminded Americans that courts h d  displaced conflict in every field \ 
where they had been instituted. "It only remains," he added, "to apply this 
gret principle between nations . . . to abolish war as an institution wholly and 
forever." Students of international law took the lead in urging the American 
people to aeoept their responsibility £or promoting international justice through 
Court membership. Manley 8. H h n  of Harvard University asked the nation 
to throw "the full weight of [its] moral influence [behind] a movement for the 
substition of law for force in international affairs." Not even the absence of en- 
forcement machinery seemed detrimental to the Court's effectiveness. "It is not 
- unreasonable to believe," asserted Southern California's Harley, "that civilized 
nations will honor the awards of a tribunal which they have solemnly created to 
make such awards."fi World opinion would enforce the Court's decrees. 
Court membership, finally, would solidify the world's peace structure with- / 
out any specific American obligation to a system of force. Herbert Hoover, ' * '  
secretary of commerce, reminded r Dm Moines audience in April, 1923, that in 
joining the Court the United States would "enter into no obligations to use ') .I 8 
arms or take no commitment that limits our freedom of action."32 Indeed, the ' ' 
United States, through Court membership, would undertake only two com- , 7 ,  ; 
mitments: to participate in the selection of judges and to pay its share of the , 
Court's expenses, estimated at forty tbusand dollars per year. But whatever :I ' 
the annual cost of maintaining the Court, Congress would reserve the right to I 
determine what the nation's shore would be. During the h a l  Senate debate, ' 1  ' ,: 
spokesmen for the Court insisted repeatedly that membership carried no national !, 1 1  
obligation except to the Court itself. As Senator Thomas A. Walsh of Mon- 
tana declared, "We enter into no covenant to do or refrain from doing any- i ' , ' S  
thing."35 The battle over Court membership, like that over the League, re- 
vealed the nature of American internationalism in the 1920s. The United States 
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would support world peace, not through specific commitments to the defense 
of the Versailles settlement, but through the encouragement of any organiza- 
tion or procedure that promised to limit change in international life to peace- 
ful processes. 
Internationalists agreed that neither the League nor the World Court had 
confronted any major political issues; nor had they demonstrated any capacity 
to restrain a major power. "The League," noted The Indqpendent in April, 1923, 
"is discreetly keeping its hands off crucial matters, and the 'balance of power,' 
which had been held up as a devilish thing, still goes on."" The cooperative ef- 
fort was new, Fosdick reminded the skeptics. In time, he predicted, the League 
could become a "central rallying-point around which the forces of law and 
peace may gather and slowly develop new approaches to common dangers and 
new methods of common action." Similarly, journalist and historian Francis 
Hackett observed in July, 1924, that the League, given time, would grow into 
an effective organization. "The more complex the creature," he wrote, "the 
more helpless its youth. When the League's members recognize the full value 
of their creation, it will become incredibly strong."35 
Realists, that tiny minority which challenged the decade's euphoria, saw no 
future in either the League or the World Court as guarantors of peace. Their 
reasoning was clear. Such international agencies, whatever their devotion to 
peaceful change, would always serve the status quo; they would never find a 
standard equally acceptable to all countries. No state dissatisfied with the dis- 
tribution of power, resources, or territory would entrust its future to an inter- 
national agency. The fallacy in the concept of peaceful change lay essentially in 
the fact that international disputes were overwhelmingly political, not judicial, 
in nature; their resolution would reflect power, not the judgments of delibera- 
tive bodies. For that reason the satisfied peoplis would protect their world, not 
with law and peaceful procedures, but with superior force. "The League con- 
ception," warned H. H. Powers, an economist and student of European affairs, 
in 1924, "is that world order, as regards the nations, is static. The nations are 
finalities. They are to stay at home, avoid tresflss, and maintain neighborly re- 
lations. . . . Mussolini and his like regard the world order as still dynamic. The 
nations are not finalities. The forces of aggression and absorption are perilously 
active, and the nation that assumes a passive attitude is doomed."" The impulse 
toward self-assertion would keep the world dynamic and sorely troubled. Those 
who shaped the public's perceptions of world events during the 1920s did not 
prepare the country to recognize this central warning. Little in their instruc- 
tion challenged the notion that the United States would fulfill its obligations to 
international stability without power, commitments, or alliances. 
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What made the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928 attractive to American iso- 
lationists and internationalists alike was the absence of enforcement machinery 
and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg's firm denial that the United States as- 
sumed any obligations under the pact. Many lauded the treaty's reliance on in- 
ternational morality; such reliance seemed to assure success with a minimum of 
risk. But Roland 5. Morris, professor of international law at the University of 
Pennsylvania, wondered how a pact based on moral force alone could protect 
the peace. Speaking before the American Society of International Law in April, 
1929, Morris questioned the pact's importance. ". . . I am not," he admitted, 
"unmindful of the moral obligations which are implied in such a strong state- 
ment of intention to avoid all war and to seek pacific means. But let us never 
forget that the legal import of a national or an international document is no 
measure whatever of its social or political potentialities."3i For the more reso- 
lute internationalists, however, the Kellogg Pact opened new possibilities for 
binding the United States more closely to the European security system through 
active consultation with the League. David Hunter Miller, a drafter of the 
League Covenant, dedared that the treaty "links the United States to the League 
of Nations as a guardian of peace; it makes the aim of that institution and the 
aims of our foreign policy in the largest sense identical. It is not too much to 
say that the Treaty in fact, though not in form, is a Treaty between the United 
States and the League."3' 
For other internationalists the Kellogg Pact's essential contribution to peace 
lay in its challenge to neutrality. Columbia University's Joseph P. Chamber- 
lain reminded the American Society of International Law in I929 that the pact 
gave nations both the opportunity and the right to stall aggression by pledging 
not to aid any treaty-breaking power. Similarly Quincy Wright, professor of 
international law at the University of Chicago, argued in I930 that aggression 
against any state was an aggression against all, including the United States. If 
the pact imposed no obligation to act, it did not deny any country the right to 
help the victims of aggression. "By ratifying the Kellogg Pact," he concluded, 
"the United States gave up the rights of neutral trade with violators of the Pact 
and was relieved of the duties of neutrality for the benefit of such states . . . ."39 
Clyde Eagleton, professor of government at New York University, insisted 
again that the United States would strengthen the Kellogg Pact most effectively 
by rejecting the rights of neutrality and threatening sanctions against would-be 
aggressors. "The world," he wrote, "stands waiting for us to translate our fre- 
quent words in behalf of peace into some form of actual support for peace . . . . 
If we want peace, as we have said in the [Kellogg Pact], we must support peace 
when the Pact is broken. We must consult and cooperate with other states 
to that end."*O Eventually those who favored peace enforcement advocated 
consultation, nonrecognition, and neutrality revision. These responses to ag- 
gression did not imply any commitment to the direct use of force; nor did they 
receive the support of the American public or congressional isolationists.4' 
Henry L. Stimson, secretary of state after March, 1929, believed that the Kel- 
logg Pact carried the potential for American collaboration in a system of col- 
lective security. Two issues in 1932 presented Stimson the opportunity to coni- 
nlit the United States to a policy of consultation under the Kellogg Pact. The 
first was the Geneva Disarmament Conference; the second, the Japanese as- 
sault on Manchuria. What threatened the success of the Geneva Conference 
was the question of French security. Article Five of the Versailles Treaty had 
assumed that the limitations on German armaments would lead to "the initia- 
tion of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." The German delc- 
gation at Geneva argued that Germany's forced disarmament was part of a 
broader agreement that eventually all the major powers would disarm. The 
French agreed, but insisted that France had accepted the obligation to disarm 
under the assumption that the United States would enter the League of Nations 
and that Britain and the United States together would guarantee French secu- 
rity.42 Stimson recognized the French challenge to American leadership; only 
the United States could break the deadlock between the German demand for 
equality and the French demand for security. How Stimson could satisfy France's 
need for security was not clear. He was not free to offer France an alliance or 
even American membership in the League. Yet the Kellogg Pact seemed to im- 
ply an obligation to consult in the event of a threatened aggression. French 
Premier Pierre Lava1 had sought a consultative pledge during his trip to Wash- 
ington in the autumn of 1931. but the Hoover administration regarded the 
promise of consultation a dangerous departure from American isolationist tra- 
3 It avoided the commitment. 
re Stimson could resolve the question of French security he faced a more 
urgent challenge in Manchuria. There Japanese aggression threatened what re- 
mained of China's political and military control over a rich province. At stake 
in the Manchurian crisis was not America's vim interest but rather the credi- 
bility of the entire post-Versailles international treaty structure that supposedly 
had eliminated force from relations among the states. Hoover and Stimson 
were faced with the challenge of making United States will effective in Japanese- 
Chinese relations without resorting to either economic or military sanctions. 
As early as November, 1931. Stimson contemplated a resort to moral sanctions. 
He concluded that month that it might be wise "to outlaw Japan and let her 
sizzle [under a Chinese boycott] and all the moral pressure of the world."44 On 
January 7, 1932, Stimson, in his first effort to terminate Japanese expansion 
h moral sanctions, sent identical notes to Japan and China declaring that 
nited States could not "admit the legality of any situation dejacto nor does 
nd to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Gov- 
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ernments" that might impair either the treaty rights of the United States or the 
territorial and administrative integrity of China.45 Both Hoover and Stimsonl 
believed that the note would be effective. Hoover declared in January that it 
had mobilized world opinion against Japan and would stand as one of the coun- 
try's great state papers. 
Japan, undaunted by Stimson's moral strictures, continued its assault on Chi- 
na. On  January 28, 1932, the Japanese invaded Shanghai. Stirnson was out- 
raged. He hoped, he confided to his diary, that the Japanese would not with- 
draw until the United States could pass firm judgment against the new aggres- 
 ion.'^ "As I reflected upon it," he recalled later, "it seemed to me that in fu- 
ture years I should not like to face a verdict of history to the'effect that a gov- 
ernment to which I belonged had failed to express itself adequately upon such 3 
situation."47 On February 16 the League Council supported the nonre~ognitioq~, 
doctrine and called upon Japan to fulfill its obligations to peaceful procedures. I 
Thereupon Stimson leveled his second moral blast at Japan in the form of an 
open letter to Senator Borah, dated February 23, 1932. Nothing, declared Stim-11 
son, had occurred to challenge the validity of the Kellogg Pact. The world had 
taken such action, he reminded the Japanese, "for the purpose of aligning the 
conscience and public opinion of the world in favor of a system of orderly de- 
velopment by the law of nations, including a settlement of all controversies by 
methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force." Stimson warned 
Tokyo that nonrecognition, if adopted by the other powers, "will eventually 
lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been 
deprived."48 Never before had Stimson made such extravagant claims for the 
coercive power of nonrecognition. Still Japan continued to move. During 
March the Japanese smuggled Henry Pu Yi, the former emperor of China, into 
Manchuria and installed him as the head of the new Japanese-controlled puppet 
state of Manchukuo. 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1932 Stimson concentrated on the 
concept of consultation, convinced that an American pledge to consult could 
resolve the Franco-German quarrel over equality in armaments at Geneva as 
well as the Manchurian crisis. A trip to Europe in April reaftirmed his suppo- 
sitions. Upon his return to Washington, Stimson assured Hoover that an 
American promise to consult under the Kellogg Pact would break the Geneva 
deadlock. For Hoover the potential political price in the forthcoming election 
was too high. Borah agreed to Stimson's scheme, provided that the United 
States retained the right not to consult. Both the Republican and Democratic 
parties wrote into their platforms the ~rinciple of consultation as a f u W e n t  of 
the nation's pledge to uphold the Kellogg Pact. Still Hoover opposed any pub- 
lic commitment to ~onsultation.~9 Despite the president's hesitancy, Stimson, 
in July, a major speech on the Kellogg Pact. The Secretary noted his 
intention in his diary of July 20: 
8.. 
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" '  During the morning 1 was developing some more of my plans for 
the future, particularly with regard to the Far East. The Japancsc 
are still pushing on with their imperialist plan. It is evident that wc 
are going to be up against the issue this fall. I am trying to think 
out ahead what to do . . . . This speech that I am at work on is real- 
ly for the purpose of laying the foundation stone for the whole pol- 
icy by giving my view of the Kellogg Pact and the importance of 
the concerted action of the nations under it.50 
After a successful maneuver to secure an invitation from the Council on For- E: : 
eign Relations in New York, Stimson delivered his speech before that body on 
August 8, 1932. "War between nations." he declared, "was renounced by the 
signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means it has become illegal 
throughout practically the entire world . . . . Hereafter when two nations en- 
gage in armed conflict either or both of them must be wrongdoers-violators of 
this general treaty law. We no longer draw a circle about them and treat them 
with the punctilios of the duelist's code. Instead we denounce them as law- 
breaker~."~l Stimson implored the nations to strengthen the Kellogg Pact by 
adding their words of condemnation to those expressed by the United States. 
"Moral disapproval," he said, "when it becomes the disapproval of the whole 
world, takes on a significance hitherto unknown in international law. For 
never before has international opinion been so organized and mobilized." Stim- 
son reviewed his repeated efforts to preserve peace in the Far East, then moved 
to his central theme: "Another consequence which followed this development 
I of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty . . . is that consultation between the signatories of 
the Pact when faced with the threat of its violation becomes inevitable."52 
Stimson received the anticipated approval for his peaceful disposition of the 
i challenges confronting the nation. Few Americans regarded consultation as a dangerous assault on American independence. b his acceptance speech before I 
the Republican convention that summer, Hoover declared that the United States 
would, "under the spirit of the pact, consult with other nations in times of 
emergency to promote world peace."53 The Times of London accepted Stim- 
son's speech as the necessary guarantee of European security which a disarma- 
ment agreement required. "His main point, the point upon which the world 
will seize," noted the Times, "is that the pact . . . necessarily carries with it the 
implication of coosultation. There can be no doubt that, given this interpreta- 
tion, the Briand-Kellogg Pact can be made, as Mr. Stimson says, 'an effective 
reality' protecting the peace of the world."" Writing in the April, 1933, issue 
. . 
T; ', 
. . 
of Foreign Affairs, Stimson asserted that the Hoover administration, in support- . . . . 
ing the Kellogg Pact, had made it "a living fogce of law in the world."55 
Stimson's August 8 speech carried the promise of American cooperation to its . 
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highest point of the decade. Clearly the secretary shared the internationalist pect," he declared, "[the term collective security] was invented, quite recently, 
conviction that the preponderance of power, placed firmly on the side of peace, as a sly means of suggesting to the more 'soft-boiled' An~ericans that somehow 
would prevent dissatisfied countries frottl.employing force to alter the status their country, in signing the Kellogg Pact, had inadvertently and against its de- 
quo. But Stimson's warning to would-be aggressors that the bulk of the world's sires assumed a quasi-membership in the League.'*58 
power opposed then1 failed to rescue the Geneva Conference or halt Japanese Strangely, those who advocated collective security almost invariably regarded 
aggression. Yale's Edwin M. Borchard challenged Stinlson's assumptions re- it as a substitute for power politics. They assumed that the preponderance of 
garding collective security. No country, he charged, had agreed to combined nations, dedicated to preserving the status quo, could prevent aggression with- 
action; nor would the world ever succeed in stopping aggression with consul- out war. Sir Alfred Zimmern, the noted British publicist and professor of inter- 
tative pacts. For Borchard the world would not have peace until it discovered a national relations at Oxford, defined collective security as "the safety ofall by all." 
rational approach to change. Any peace structure which sought merely to per- Happily, for him, the free, constitutional, and democratic states which he msted 
petuate the status quo. he predicted, would ultinlately collapse. By accepting controlled the bulk of the world's resources; through cooperative oconomic 
aggression as a fact of life the old system had achieved occasional peace; the new policies they could defend their universe against aggression without compro- 
system, bound to the defense of the status quo, would not achieve even that.56 mise or war. Denna Frank Fleming, of Vanderbilt University, writing in No- 
vember. 1937, insisted that the United States take its place at the center of a col- 
lective security system, whether the commitment be to the League or to an al- 
VI liance. But he denied that collective security would lead to war. "No collec- 
tive action taken by a preponderance of the nations against an aggressor," he 
Nothing in the Uan&uri&n experience p r e p a d  ehe United States to con- , wrote, "can hereafter be legally called war, nor be morally considered as war." 
front b w p r r i ~ g  a g p s s i m s  ol tlblph Hitles and Benito Mussolini after -.,, ' He agreed with Zimmern that preponderant economic power, if used effec 
1935. R e c o g n i ~ g  no cleaK and inexap;lble interest in Europe's Ver)ailles or- I , tively, would prevent aggression without the danger of war." Clyde Bagleton. 
der, politicians, j o u d t s ,  and scholars sunained the illusion that diplo-A in a speech at Harvard in December, 1937, agreed that collective action did not 
matic and nlilit;cry a & t b n  Erm Europe's strife could still guarantee the na- ,,-# mean war. "Collective security," he explained, "means the combination om- 
tion's peace with a m3hin~un1 of risk. What separated A d c a n s  in their re- ! I nium contra unum -of the community against the lawbreaker, he may 
sponse to  the Nazi &auenge was nat their desire to avoid war but their vary- ,., be." Such a combination of all countries would render aggression futile; there- 
ing perceptions of the p k e  that such avoidance would demand. lsolationists te, "no state would have to demand the blQad of its mothers' 
that c o n t i n 4  pea= would require its price in diminished trade and a ' ,  , . . . . An international police force recruited by volunteer darts would be 
changing international order. Many agreed that Versailles had imposed unfair : 
1 
restrictions on *many; the denlocracies, therefore, could serve their interestsn Those who advocated collective security through the k w u e  generally denied 
more ef&ctiuely throw& treaty revision than through sanctions against Ger--, , I. at League action need involve the United States in the politics of Europe or 
many, which would save neither the treaty nor the peace. isolationist Senator:, T. Shotwell, of Columbia University, insisted in 1936 that the 
Gerald P. N p  insisted that the American people would not "consciously en-, sustain the peace no better "tha#by maintaining an international 
dorse a war whhh h d  no other object than to maintain the  articular status ,#, e pacification. The League is that one body." For Shotwell, 
which was established at Versaille~."~~ Isolationists after 1935 favored pre: ,, ctive defense under the League would reqaire only a regional 
pardness that would defend the Western Hemisphere. There the ~ e ~ u b l i c ! -  , Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, professor d international law at the 
could Buorish without regard to what happened in the outside world. niversity of California, argued that League sanctions, if organized regionally, 
Some A d c a n  and European experts respmded to the threat a[ aggression 1 ' 1 ~  ould eliminate the United States from a European or Asian security system. 
with more frequent appeals to  collective security. In 1934 and 1935 the Gllec- ickinson presented his formula for global security at the University of Chi- 
tive Security Committee of the League-sponsored International Studis Confer-. , ' 
ence met in London. The committee sought some formula that would enable) 
the United States to discard neutrality 'in favor of collaboration. In August, Collective security may encompass the globe without universalizing 
1935, C. A. W. Manning, of the University of London, delivered a lecture on every sanctioning device. In our time the universal league of na- 
c o k t i v e  &ty at the Geneva Institute of International ~elations. "I sus-' ' tions will be a league of consultatioil and co-operation . . . fortified 
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by a sanctioning procedure which supplements universal commit- 
ments with regional undertakings graduated with due regard for the 
geographical position of members of the international community. 
As regards the assurance of collective security, this probably means 
that we shall have a league of nations for Europe within the uni- 
versal league. 
For Planing also the League's collective security system would not commit the 
United States or even the European powers to the protection of peace every- 
where. Gemgraphic safety permitted a graduated responsibility. Those most di- 
rectly endangered by aggression would carry the major responsibility for op- 
posing it. Maw distant countries would fuliill their obligations by applying 
economic sanctions. It was not strange that critics of collective security, such as 
Borchard, predicted that the system would always f;lil. "In practice," he wrote, 
". . . the ccakivkts do not remain collected and . . . the divergence of their in- 
terests is disclad as soon as they are asked to act." Nations, he suggested, 
would n e w  M interests other than their own." 
R s o m l t  ad his secretary of state, Codell Hdl, desired a formula that 
would convey theit deep concern for Europe's stability even while it permitted 
the Udted Stag~s ts amid 211 responsibility for its preservation. Hull perfected 
a uniquely Amerioan r*L for upholding the status quo by urging aggressors to 
follow the treaty-*biding example of the United States. He d l e d  an all coun- 
tries ta obsave fafthtdy &eh international agreements and to mod& them, if 
necessary, "by ordcrly pmxixsas carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and 
accommodaoion." How appeals ts international law end the precepts of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, which avoided both commitments and risk, could be ef- 
fective in preventhg "8;pession was not clear. In the past, nonrecognition and 
the enunciation of principles had s e n d  only as a device to escape responsibility 
for what occand. 
As Eump drifted toward war, Roosevelt concluded fmm time to time that 
.he might display world leadership, without accepting any unwanted commit- 
ments, by calling an international conference. Such a conference, conforming 
to H a s  emphasis on orderly and peaceful procedures, would search for the 
princip.1~~ whereby nations might resolve their dserences through mutual 
agreement. Unfortunately, this reliance on rules of con&&, with its concomi- 
tant burden of eliminating Hitler's demands totally without the necessity of 
war, rendered United States diplomacy irrelevant. Hitler bad warned the de- 
mocracies that he would ignore any efforts at collective diplomacy. Ambassa- 
dor to Poland John Cudahy reminded Rwsevelt in January, 1937, that any in- 
tervention "without some speciS.c remedy for the difficulties over here would 
not only be unavailing but would be a mistake from the viewpoint of Ameri- L ", I . 
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can prestige."62 Only if Roosevelt were prepared to address Germany's de- 
mands directly, Cudahy concluded, would the effort achieve anything. 
Throughout 1937 Roosevelt toyed with a variety of conference proposals. 
Finally, in January, 1938, he presented to the British government a proposal for 
an international conference to work out principles of international conduct, dis- 
armament and trade.63 Those principles would give Hitler the choice of accept- 
ing the limitations imposed on Germany by the treaty system or defying that 
system through force and accepting the risks of that decision. Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain, convinced that the challenge of Hitler and Mussolini re- 
quired a series of specific settlements, could find no solution to Europe's prob- 
lems in Roosevelt's proposal. He rejected it. "The plan," he wrote in his diary, 
"appears to me fantastic and likely to excite the derision of Germany and Italy. 
They might even use it to postpone conversations with us and if we were asso- 
ciated with it they would see in it another attempt on the part of the democratic 
bloc to put the dictators in the w r ~ n g . " ~  Negotiations with Germany and 
Italy, ran the basic theme of the prime minister's reply, required some concrete 
bases of agreement. Britain, therefore, would recognize the de jure Italian con- 
quest of Abyssinia and in time would propose similar measures to satisfy Ger- 
man aspirations. Chamberlain suggested that Roosevelt delay his conference 
call while the London government tackled some of the specific questions in Eu- 
ropean politics.65 
Roosevelt's second message, withdrawing his project, clarified the depth of 
his tactical disagreement with Chamberlain and demonstrated again the Ameri- 
can dedication to peaceful changes and the preservation of the status quo. He 
reminded the prime minister that the de jure recognition of Italy's claim to Ab- 
yssinia would undermine the efforts of other countries to defend their terri- 
tories against aggression. Specifically, noted Roosevelt, it might have a harm- 
ful effect "upon the nature of the peace terms which Japan might demand from 
China." He warned, moreover, that a surrender of the principle of nonrecog- 
nition would seriously damage public opinio* the United States. The Amer- 
ican people would support measures of international cooperation only if they 
were "destined to re-establish and maintain the principles of international law 
and morality."66 In Washington Hull reminded British Ambassador Sir Ron- 
11d Lindsay that United States policy rested primarily on moral precepts and 
'the sanctity of agreements and the preservation of international law, both of 
which rest on this moral foundation. . . ."67 The desperado nations, he warned 
Lindsay, would herald British recognition of the Italian conquest as a virtual 
ratification of their treaty-breaking policies. The secretary admitted that the 
policy of nonrecognition, as one of indefinite duration.  resented di6culties; he 
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Hitler began his assault on the territorial provisions of the Versailles Treaty 
with the Anschluss of Austria in March, 1938. Hull's response was predictable. 
"It is our profound conviction," he wrote, "that the most effective contribution 
we, as a nation sincerely devoted to peace, can make . . . is to have this country 
respected throughout the world for integrity, justice, goodwill, strength, and 
unswerving loyalty to principles." The State Department's official pronounce- 
ment on Hitler's annihilation of Czechoslovakia a year later differed only in lan- 
guage from Hull's response to the Austrian Anschluss: 
This government . . . cannot refrain from making known this coun- 
try's condemnation of the acts which have resulted in the temporary 
extinguishment of the liberties of a free and independent people. . . . 
The position of the government of the United States has been con- 
sistently clear. It has emphasized the need for respect for the sanc- 
tity of treaties and the pledged word, and for nonintervention by 
any nation in the domestic affairs of other nations; and it has . . . ex- 
pressed its condemnation of a policy of military aggression. 
Several days later Hull reminded the press of America's role in European affairs. 
"We in this country," he said, "have striven, particularly in recent years, and 
we shall continue to strive, to strengthen the threatened structure of world 
peace by fostering in every possible way the rule of law. . . ."68 For an isola- 
tionist nation the merit of such internationalism lay in its total irrelevance to 
the existing conditions in international life. 
With the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact on August 24, 
1939, what remained of Europe's Versailles structure began to crumble. Roose- 
velt met the challenge to peace by addressing a message to King Victor Emman- 
uel of Italy, inviting the Italian government to frame specific proposals for a sol- 
ution of the Danzig crisis. In London Ambassador Joseph Kennedy advised the 
president, if he contemplated any action in behalf of peace, to work on the Po- 
lish government.69 Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle wondered how 
Washington might word a strong message to Poland, for the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
granted western Poland to Germany and eastern Poland to Russia. The mes- 
sage, wrote Berle, would need to begin: "In view of the fact that your suicide 
is required, kindly oblige etc." Britain, Washington assumed, wanted the Uni- 
ted States to do what it could not do. "As we saw it here," noted Assistant 
Secretary Jay Pierrepont Moffat, "it merely meant that they wanted us to assume 
the responsibility of a new Munich and to do their dirty work for them."70 
Roosevelt refused to arrange what might have led to the sellout of another 
country. 
Again on August 24 Roosevelt responded to the accumulating pressures by 
I Norman A. Graebnec Between the Wars 65 I addressing messages to Hitler and President Ignacy Moscicki of Poland, urging them to settle their differences through negotiation, arbitration, or conciliation. Berle discounted the president's effort. "These messages,'' he recorded in his diary, "will have about the same effect as a valentine sent to somebody's mother- in-law out of season, and they have all that quality of naivett which is the pre- rogative alone of the United States. Nevertheless, they ought to be sent. The one certain thing in this business is that no one will be blamed for making any 
I attempt, however desperate, at preserving peace." As the European situation 
continued to disintegrate, Washington focused its attention on London, hoping 
that Britain might still avert war by negotiating a Danzig settlement. "There 
really is not much for us to do other than wait," Moffat observed on August 28. 
"What trumps we had were long since played."71 Chamberlain, Kennedy re- 
ported, doubted that Danzig was worth a war and hoped that Poland would 
compromise. But no Polish officials would follow the footsteps of Czech leaders 
to their destruction. Hitler's invasion of Poland on September I dragged Britain 
and France into war without any assurance of support from the United States. 
The promising world of Versailles, resting on the preponderance of allied power, 
now lay m ruins. 
Throughout the crisis years of the 1930s Roosevelt and his advisers assumed 
I that in a rational environment the highest interests of nations would automat- 
ically converge on the question of peace. In rejecting war a government had no 
choice but to accept the limits imposed on it by the world" treaty structure. It 
I was logical, therefore, that Roosevelt and Hull would direct their major diplo- 
matic effort toward the goal of impressing on all governments their obligations 
to honor their international agreements. Tragically, the status quo that Wash- 
ington sought to preserve did not serve the interests of all countries equally. 
The effort to prevent change in the Versailles order served the interests of the 
United States and the Western democracies quite as admirably as the destruc- 
tion of that order would serve the interests of other, less satisfied countries. 
The rigid principle of peaceful change based w r l d  politics not on the rights 
conveyed by strength and efficiency but on the rights of possession. This would- 
be utopia formed the bulwark of an unchanging order. 
Writers on world affairs, no less than national leaders, examined the critical 
problem of peace, stability, and change in international society. Scholars agreed 
that peace assigned no special merit to the status quo. Shotwell observed ac- 
curately that the central problem confronting international relations was "the 
need for a more flexible structure than that which identifies justice with the sta- 
tus quo." It was better to permit change, even through force, echoed Borchard, 
than to "endow the existing status quo with moral sanctity." To  uphold a de- 
caying status quo, he noted, might be "anything but const~uctive."~ Dickin- 
son warned that the organization of effective sanctions dared not take prece- 
dence over "the development of proceduresfor orderly modification of the stcl- 
r 
H 66 MIDWESTERN ISOLATIONISM 
tus quo." In emphasizing the need for peaceful change, Dickinson added: "If 
security for the society of nations implies an assurance of orderly progress, col- 
lective security may be defined as co-operation in the attainment of such an 
assurance." Eagleton observed that the community of nations would never pre- 
, vent war until it provided individual states with peaceful procedures to remedy 
injustices. "If 'force is used merely to maintain the status quo, to preserve for the 
beatipossi&ntes their happy situation," he predicted, "the system is bound to fail.r3 
. 
# I r n  Unfortunately the problem of peaceful change among sovereigii nations de- 
-"mtfied solution. In practice any system of collective security would seek order 
rather than change. For British historian Edward Hallett Carr,collective secu- 
rity was merely a device of the status quo powers to prevent unwanted change 
in the international system. Carr observed in The Twenty YearsJCrisis (1939): 
Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, 
which guarantees its own security and predominance, . . . so inter- 
national peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant 
Powers. In the past, Roman and British imperialism were com- 
mended to the world in the guise of the pax Romana and the pax 
(r Britannica. Today, when no single Power is strong enough to domi- 
nate the world, and supremacy is vested in a group of nations, slo- 
gans like "collective security" and "resistance to aggression" serve the 
same purpose of prodaiming an identity of interest between the domi- 
nant group and the world as a whole in the maintenance of peace.74 
Against such an alliance of status quo powers change would come through 
I force or not at all. Ultimately the lack of machinery for peaceful change gave 
I the satisfied powers no choice but to cling to the treaty structure, whatever 
I their limited will to defend it. Fleming exposed this critical dilemma con- 
I fronting the democracies. He admitted that the status quo was imperfect, but, he predicted, any effort to smash the map of Europe would produce enough 
slaughter and destruction to render justice even more elusive. "Sometimes," he 
wrote, "a European status quo must be accepted as sufficiently definitive to be 
preferable to any continental war designed to end it. . . ."% Unfortunately, the 
Western preference for the status quo did not recommend the means for pre- 
serving it. 
Students of international relations, no less than spokesmen of the Roosevelt 
administration, defined a proper American response to aggression not in terms 
of the world that existed but in terms of the world that they thought should 
exist-one that could, through rules of proper international conduct, resolve 
the conflicting purposes among the satisfied and dissatisfied powers peacefully 
and without change. Tragically, the realities of European politics were differ- 
4 
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ent; the choices confronting the democracies were limited, immediate, and ines- 
capable. Europe's arbitrary boundaries, no less than Europe's peace, rested on 
strength of arms. The makers of Versailles had either to revise those boundaries 
as time passed through diplomatic procedures or keep potential aggressors weak 
by force. They did neither, preferring to behave on the assumption that they 
could protect their privileged positions without sacrificing their freedom in 
binding defensive guarantees or accepting a new European order of power. 
Having abjured the historic courses available to them, they would now de- 
fend what remained of their universe through the very alliances and destruc- 
tion they had sought to avoid. 
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